Kyiv School of Economics is pleased to invite to the academic seminar "On Nondegenerate Equilibria of Double Auctions with Several Buyers and a Price Floor" by Pavlo Prokopovych. It will be held on October 29 at 17:00 (Kyiv time). 

About the speaker. Pavlo Prokopovych is an associate professor of the Kyiv School of Economics. His academic interests lie in game theory and mathematical economics. He got a PhD degree at  the University of Michigan. 

Abstract. This paper investigates the existence of a nondegenerate pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a double auction between one seller and several heterogeneous buyers in the independent private value framework. It begins with three examples describing some of the model’s particular features. After studying a number of continuity-related properties of the interim payoff functions, we construct a sequence of strategy profiles that converges to a nondegenerate monotone Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game under some strict monotonicity conditions. The equilibrium existence result is applied to a double auction with risk-averse bidders.

This seminar is enabled by the financial support from Sweden.