In the second quarter of 2026, Ukraine made significant procedural progress toward EU accession. Following the lifting of Hungary’s veto, the European Union formally opened the first negotiating cluster, Fundamentals, for Ukraine and Moldova on June 15, being among key events described in the Ukraine EU Accession Tracker by KSE Institute, a new quarterly analytical product that comprehensively assesses the Ukraine’s European integration process, key events from the Ukraine and EU sides, legal proceedings, finances and developments in EU partner countries.

The resumption of negotiations became possible after a shift in Budapest’s political position following the government’s change. Hungary’s new government agreed to lift the blockade after receiving assurances regarding minority rights. At the same time, the rapid opening of the first cluster was the result of a “front-loading” strategy: substantive work on individual clusters had continued informally even before the veto was formally lifted.

The opening of Cluster 1, Fundamentals, does not automatically lead to membership, but it does move Ukraine to the stage of implementing specific commitments. These primarily concern the rule of law, the judiciary, anti-corruption policy, human rights, and the capacity of state institutions. This cluster is opened first and closed last, and progress within it will determine the overall pace of the negotiations.

The key domestic document of the quarter was the National Programme for the Adaptation of Legislation, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on April 1, 2026. It translates the results of the screening process into a practical action plan, identifying which laws the Verkhovna Rada must adopt, which institutions need to be created or reformed, and which rules must be aligned with the EU acquis.

The Kachka–Kos plan in the areas of the rule of law and anti-corruption remains a separate track. It sets out ten priority steps, including strengthening the independence of NABU and SAPO, expanding their jurisdiction, adopting a new Anti-Corruption Strategy and Programme, and reforming the State Bureau of Investigation. Implementation of the plan is currently moving slowly: the Membership Check initiative has assessed progress as limited so far, and other assessments have reached a similar conclusion.

Of the 11 priority laws, 5 have been fully adopted. Among the most problematic are draft laws on the restoration of state aid control, NEURC independence, and district heating reform. Around €4 billion in financing is linked to these reforms, meaning that delays create not only negotiation risks but also budgetary risks.

The financial architecture of support for Ukraine became more clearly defined in the second quarter. On April 23, the Council of the EU finalized the €90 billion EU Ukraine Support Loan for 2026–2027, and on May 28, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the relevant documents. Of the €45 billion available in 2026, €8.35 billion is expected to be provided as macro-financial assistance, another €8.35 billion through the Ukraine Facility, and up to €28.3 billion is earmarked for defense needs. In addition, the seventh reform-linked tranche under the Ukraine Facility, amounting to nearly €2.8 billion, was approved on May 28 and disbursed on June 8.

On the EU side, the space for enlargement is narrowing even as the door opens. The bloc is entering a crowded political cycle, with elections in Sweden and Latvia this autumn and in France in 2027, alongside difficult negotiations over the EU’s 2028–2034 budget. It makes enlargement harder to prioritize. A parallel debate over “gradual integration,” reflected in recent Franco-German proposals, raises questions not only about when Ukraine joins but also about what form it takes. KSE Institute notes that the conditions that enabled the June breakthrough may not persist, which is why using the current favorable momentum matters. 

Ukraine will be able to maintain the pace of negotiations if it quickly uses the current political momentum, fulfills its anti-corruption commitments, and secures support for difficult reforms in the Verkhovna Rada.