According to KSE Institute estimates, providing the veterans’ entitlements covered by the study’s model could cost Ukraine between UAH 758.6 billion and UAH 1.1 trillion over three years, depending on whether war continues or ends and on the scope of state support. Payments related to discharge from military service and war-related injuries, including disability pensions, account for 68–94% of these costs. The study also finds a substantial gap between the support guaranteed to veterans, the assistance they actually receive, and the need veterans declare.
These are the findings of a new KSE Institute report, When Peace Comes: The Cost and Architecture of Veterans Policy in Ukraine. It examines whether existing government programmes meet veterans’ needs, how much it would cost to deliver on these commitments, and how Ukraine can prepare its support system for potential large-scale demobilisation or war continuation.
Ukraine has around 1.8 million people with combatant status or war-related disabilities in 2026, of whom approximately 495,000 have already been demobilised according to KSE Institute estimates. In recent years, the government has expanded programmes covering medical and psychological care, housing, employment and entrepreneurship support. However, some of these entitlements remain insufficiently funded, while shortages of specialists and service providers limit access to support.
To assess future spending, KSE Institute developed a model covering 46 programmes across six areas of state support. The researchers examined six scenarios, combining continued war or war end with three approaches to veterans’ entitlements. The baseline scenario reflects existing government commitments and actual uptake of services. The Veterans Code scenario is based on the draft Veterans Code, while the KSE scenario envisages broader access to priority services and a review of certain benefits.
The model projects the lowest spending under the Veterans Code scenario if the war continues, largely because the draft does not cover a number of existing entitlements. Spending is highest under the KSE scenario if war ends, as large-scale demobilisation increases payments and wider uptake of priority services requires additional resources.
If war ends, the model assumes that around 940,000 military personnel could leave service over three years, compared with approximately 350,000 if the war continues. These are assumptions used to estimate costs, not forecasts of actual demobilisation. Across the scenarios, payments related to discharge and war-related injuries could amount to UAH 711.8–826.6 billion over three years. In the event of large-scale demobilisation, a substantial share of one-off payments would be concentrated at the beginning of the period.
The study also examines veterans’ needs. According to a KSE Institute survey conducted in April 2026, and surveys conducted by other organizations, the most commonly reported needs were medical treatment (36%), utility bill benefits (33%), financial support (27%), dental care (24%), housing (22%), assistance with obtaining official statuses and benefits (21%), psychological support (19%) and employment (17%).
According to the report, access to many services remains limited. For instance, around 10,000 people received psychological support through a government programme in 2025. The KSE Institute estimates the need in this service at the level of approximately 83,700 demobilised veterans.
Similar gaps exist in vocational training, business support or housing support. For instance, around 11% of demobilised veterans, or approximately 54,500 people, live in unstable or crisis housing conditions. The eOselia affordable mortgage programme is more accessible to those who can afford an initial down payment.
Ukraine’s veteran policy lacks funding and clear priorities. The government continues to expand its list of entitlements without determining how many people can actually use them or whether assistance reaches those who need it most. As a result, access often depends on how well informed veterans are and when they apply, rather than how urgently they need support.
KSE Institute recommends establishing clear priorities for veterans’ entitlements and which groups of veterans can use them, how much it will cost, as well as assess efficiency and relevance of veterans’ needs.
The fiscal costs of demobilisation should be planned in advance, and an analysis of system capacity to provide services should be performed.
A separate workstream is revising the draft Veterans Code with wide conversation with society and other stakeholders. None of the proposed scenarios determine what Ukraine’s veterans policy should ultimately look like. Instead, they illustrate the costs and trade-offs of different approaches. International experience suggests that large-scale demobilisation used to happen faster than governments could adapt their support systems. Therefore, veterans, serving military personnel, government institutions, and civil society should find a common ground on the architecture of future veterans policy before demobilisation begins.
