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Дата публікації: October 14, 2026

Official trade statistics may not fully reflect the true volume of military-use goods imports to Russia – Russian CHP Imports Tracker, Q3 2026

Published: October 14, 2026
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KSE Institute has published the third quarterly issue of the Russian CHP Imports Tracker, which examines Russia’s ability to import critical goods subject to export restrictions imposed by the sanctions coalition. In this third issue, the authors expanded their analysis by cross-referencing open export statistics with data on individual import transactions. This approach reveals where official trade statistics may not fully capture Russia’s import flows.

The most notable discrepancy compared to official data concerns Hong Kong. Its recorded exports of goods on the Common High Priority (CHP) list to Russia have more than halved since the start of the full-scale invasion, while estimated volumes may have roughly doubled. For goods in CHP Tiers 1, 2, and 3.A – including integrated circuits, wireless communication components, and discrete electronic components – data on individual import transactions point to volumes 3–4 times higher than officially recorded exports.

The expanded analysis also changes the overall picture of CHP imports to Russia. Combining official trade statistics with data on individual import transactions suggests that import volumes in 2023 may have matched or even exceeded pre-war levels, before declining in 2024. China remains the leading supplier even after accounting for potential underrepresentation in trade data – its share stands at roughly 50–70%, depending on the month, rather than over 75% as official statistics suggest.

The potential gap between official and estimated volumes is assessed at approximately $5–6 billion for Hong Kong and $6–7 billion for China, compared to less than $1 billion for sanctions coalition countries. In China’s case, this discrepancy is almost entirely attributable to Tier 1 – microelectronics. This is also the only CHP category where estimated volumes have consistently exceeded pre-war levels. Meanwhile, direct CHP exports from sanctions coalition countries have declined sharply since 2022, and the analysis finds little evidence of significant underrepresentation in export data from coalition countries.

Future issues of the Russian CHP Imports Tracker will expand the analysis of potentially unrecorded exports and revisit the price premium assessment presented in the second issue.

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