SCALING A FOUNDER-LED MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICE: DESIGN AND VALIDATION OF AN EDTECH ECOSYSTEM FOR RUDNYTSKA.SPACE

By

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Abstract

This capstone project examines the strategic transformation of RUDNYTSKA.SPACE, a founder-centric private psychology practice, into a scalable, brand-driven EdTech ecosystem. Initially, an operational audit revealed a critical growth bottleneck: despite generating over 1,000 monthly therapy inquiries from an audience of 93,000+ followers, the solo-expert model mechanically limited capacity to 100 sessions per month, leading to a 90% lead loss and high burnout risk. To address this, a three-tier EdTech ecosystem was designed to decouple revenue from the founder's physical time.

The research utilized a mixed-methods approach, including an operational audit, digital ethnography, and real-time market experiments. Retrospective and prospective validation suggests empirical support for the "Brand Trust Transfer" hypothesis and the substitution effect. The proposed financial model introduces a diversified product ladder consisting of mass-market digital courses, a curated B2C/B2B marketplace operating on a 30% commission, and exclusive premium mentorship.

Financial projections indicate that this ecosystem can achieve a robust net margin of approximately 55.1% and operational break-even at around 56 active marketplace clients, significantly increasing the founder's effective hourly rate. The project concludes with a phased 24-month implementation roadmap and risk management framework, indicating that leveraging personal brand authority into a curated platform demonstrates commercial feasibility and scalability under the stated assumptions.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI – Artificial Intelligence

B2B – Business-to-Business

B2C – Business-to-Consumer

CAC – Customer Acquisition Cost

COGS – Cost of Goods Sold

CPL – Cost per Lead

CRM – Customer Relationship Management

CVR – Conversion Rate

EdTech – Educational Technology

FOP – Individual Entrepreneur / Фізична особа-підприємець

GDPR – General Data Protection Regulation

GMV – Gross Merchandise Value

HR – Human Resources

KSE – Kyiv School of Economics

LLC – Limited Liability Company

LMS – Learning Management System

LTV – Lifetime Value

mhGAP – Mental Health Gap Action Programme

MLA – Modern Language Association

MRR – Monthly Recurring Revenue

MVP – Minimum Viable Product

OKR – Objectives and Key Results

OPEX – Operating Expenses

P&L – Profit and Loss

PTSD – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

ROI – Return on Investment

SaaS – Software as a Service

SLA – Service Level Agreement

SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats

TAM – Total Addressable Market

TOV – Товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю / Limited Liability Company

TOWS – Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses, and Strengths

UAH – Ukrainian Hryvnia

UIPP – Ukrainian Institute of Positive Psychotherapy

VIP – Very Important Person / Premium Client Segment

WHO – World Health Organization

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. CLIENT CONTEXT

This project will examine the business case for RUDNYTSKA.SPACE, a private psychology practice created by expert Iryna Rudnytska. This case is a relevant scenario for examination because it has the advantage of already having a defined audience base of over 93,000 social media followers (see Appendix A). The audience engagement is high, but the business has not kept up to effectively address the scale.

The war in Ukraine has completely changed the role of mental health in the country, changing the sector from a small component of the overall healthcare system to one of the most important areas for rebuilding the economy and society of the country (National Institute for Strategic Studies). When the conflict is still active and it is hard to gather exact numbers, the Ministry of Health (2023) estimates that a massive portion of the population will require some form of psychological help (Ministry of Health of Ukraine). While many different aspects of this crisis are beyond measurement, the macro-economic impact is extremely large (World Bank Group). Both governments and the private sector reacted very differently to this crisis. While the private sector responded with new digital technology driven “aggregator” platforms with not full quality control, the public sector response included creating primary psychological care programs and establishing public mental health centers to cover the basic level of market activity (Ministry of Health of Ukraine).

1.2. PRIMARY BUSINESS PROBLEM

Firstly, a large market gap exists externally, as many Ukrainians report that they do not receive help due to private therapy prices, and others state that they would never go to see mass-market therapists (Gradus Research). There is also documented research indicating that Ukrainian refugees experience a "help-seeking avoidance" behavior and internalized stigma (PAQ Research). This prevents them from formally seeking professional help in another country (Center for Economic Strategy). The result is significant market inefficiency: there are people who need help but either do not want to pay inflated prices to leading private specialists, do not trust mass aggregators, or do not want to seek formal medical care due to social stigma (Gradus Research).

Secondly, internally the business operates using a traditional service-based model that has successfully capitalized on the time of the practitioner, but this has produced a major operational constraint. The company has developed a well-known brand name that receives a massive volume of requests for therapy services per month (as long as the company continues to post consistently active content). However, due to physical limitations, the expert can provide psychological assistance to only a small fraction of these clients. Currently, due to the premium pricing structure of therapy services and limited availability of time-slots, the absolute majority of the company's potential client base cannot be served by the current operation model. The active income model limits revenue generation to the work-hours of the expert, and sets a financial limit on possible revenues. Additionally, this model generates high risks for burn-out (Deloitte Ukraine). The problem with this approach is that it lacks the necessary infrastructure to systematically reach its highly fragmented audience. As a result, the company misses out on revenue opportunities and fails to achieve its goal of providing accessible healthcare.

1.3. PROJECT GOAL

The primary goal of this project is to create a scalable plan that changes the business from a service-based model to a brand-driven EdTech ecosystem. The objective is to separate revenue growth from the physical time of the founder. Given the identified market niche, a hybrid business model seems entirely realistic. The idea behind this concept is that a recognized personal brand (the founder's authority) is used to promote an EdTech ecosystem, which offers easily accessible psychological support outside of traditional clinical structures. This includes the development of a multi-tier product architecture, consisting of scalable digital products, a curated marketplace of supervised psychologists, and premium high-touch services. The proposed model aims to recapture previously lost demand by matching different audience segments with appropriate price points and service formats, while ensuring high quality through centralized brand management and monitoring.

1.4. PROJECT SCOPE

This goal is to be achieved through practical approaches. Therefore, it is first necessary to conduct an operational audit to identify traffic losses and, accordingly, establish financial constraints for the individual practice model. To justify investment in the new structure, it is necessary to understand the economic indicators of the current situation. The next step will be to conduct a qualitative and quantitative market analysis to map the customer journey and verify whether digital products and junior therapists can serve as market substitutes for in-person therapy for the price-sensitive segment.

In addition, will be developed an architecture of the EdTech ecosystem as the third step. With this, the structuring of digital courses and a curated marketplace will be realized. The personal brand will be used as a quality guarantee for a team of psychologists, this provides a relative competitive advantage and directly addresses the trust barrier identified in the market analysis. Also, the company should explore opportunities to expand its operations in the B2B segment, capitalizing on the 50% increase in the popularity of corporate mental health programs (Deloitte Ukraine).

1.5. DELIVERABLES

The final deliverable of this project will be a strategic roadmap and a validation plan to launch this startup, supported by empirical evidence of demand and a viable lean business model. The scalability of the proposed model depends on the validation of critical behavioral and economic assumptions, which are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 2. Analytical Section: Research and Diagnostics

2.1. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

To address the scalability issue in this project, a pragmatic approach is used, combining mixed methods and based on the principles of research. This methodology allows solutions to be tested through experimentation and is therefore not purely theoretical research.

The research design is constructed into three consecutive logical phases:

Diagnosis of the Current Business Model: Quantitative assessment of the lead loss levels, determination of unit economics (including the opportunity cost of time) and establishment of the financial constraints of the current “As-Is” model through an operational audit of internal CRM and sales records over the last 12 months.

Behavioral Audience Research: Qualitative analysis using the Digital Ethnography method of data collection. Systematic analysis of more than 100 direct messages and comments allows reconstruction of the “voice of the customer”. This phase determines specific psychological barriers (for example, stigma, trust deficits) and develops behavioral user personas.

Experimental Testing of Alternative Products: Utilization of the existing brand community (93,000+ followers) as a real-time testing environment to empirically validate EdTech and Marketplace hypotheses. An interactive Instagram survey (price sensitivity test and “trust transfer” mechanism) and a Concierge MVP Waitlist experiment were conducted within this phase. Willingness to use services of a team of psychologists does not always translate into consistent behavior, and introduces some uncertainty into assumptions regarding customer retention and lifetime value. That's why, all assumptions regarding customer retention and lifetime value in the financial model should be considered as baseline estimates rather than guaranteed outcomes.

Sample Justification and Limitations: It is reasonable to utilize the Instagram community as the primary research sample for this study due to the fact that these individuals represent a “real”, warmed-up consumer base and the future ecosystem will monetize them. However, from an academic perspective, there are certain limitations associated with this sample. These include selection bias, where the predominant group consists of digitally active, brand-aware urban females. While these results are sufficient for validation of internal startup metrics, they cannot be generalized to the Ukrainian population as a whole. The results obtained in this chapter refer specifically to the existing personal brand audience and should not be interpreted as applicable to the broader Ukrainian population.

What does this mean for strategy? The described combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches ensures that the proposed EdTech ecosystem is based on validated real-life user behavior rather than speculative hypotheses.

2.2. OPERATIONAL AUDIT OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES (AS-IS ANALYSIS)

The as-is analysis of the current business model was carried out using internal data over the past 18 months. As a result of this process, several major limitations for business development were identified. At present, the company has adopted the traditional model of a solo expert. The main source of revenue of the company comes from the sale of the founder's time.

High Efficiency and Illusion of Low CAC

The initial impression is that the unit economics of a single customer seem to be unusually efficient. There is a very high level of customer retention: On average each patient makes 9 visits and generates LTV at the level of 31,500 to 36,000 UAH. Additionally, since the company does not hire employees or spend money on advertising, its gross margin appears to be near 100%.

But this unusually high efficiency is a pure illusion. In reality, the Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) is not equal to zero. To properly assess the economics, it is necessary to consider the

Opportunity Cost of Time. A large number of hours of the founder's time are spent creating high-quality content in order to attract "free" traffic. If multiplying the number of hours the founder spends creating content by the hourly rate, the actual customer acquisition cost (CAC) increases significantly. Thus, it represents significant Cost of Goods Sold (COGS). Manual lead processing implies an additional and increasing cost of acquiring customers. Moreover, the current model does not take into consideration other expenses such as taxes, platform fees, and production costs.

Complete reliance on organic reach limits opportunities for future growth. The planned performance marketing (paid traffic), which will be implemented within the scope of the new ecosystem model, requires allocating a specific budget for this purpose. Any future scaling beyond the current follower base will require measuring a paid CAC. Thus, under the current system, the founder’s resources are divided between two areas: providing therapeutic services and acting as a full-time marketing specialist. This situation leads to the quick burnout of the founder (Deloitte Ukraine).

Gap Analysis and Lost Traffic Segmentation

It has become clear that there is a significant gap between the number of requests received and the number of sessions conducted. More than 1,000 inquiries arrive every month under active content publishing, whereas the maximum possible number of sessions performed is 90–100, but not all incoming contacts represent monetizable demand. There is a difference between general audience engagement, therapy-intent inquiries, and fully qualified leads with the ability and willingness to pay. So, approximately 900 potential leads are lost every month. This number includes users whose intentions range from explicit requests for therapy to more passive expressions of interest. Thats why, this estimate should be interpreted as an upper-bound estimate of monetizable attention rather than a strictly qualified sales pipeline.

To support the product strategy, it is essential to segment these 900 lost leads:

Price-sensitive Segment (~50–60%): These potential customers clearly show an intention to make a purchase, but when they hear the price of 4,000 UAH, it becomes a barrier for them. They require low-cost EdTech products (Tier 1).

Time-constrained Segment (~15–20%): These are customers who are willing to pay for services but receive a direct refusal due to a lack of available time slots. They represent immediate, high-intent demand for a mid-market team of supervised psychologists (Tier 2).

Informational/emotional inquiries (~20–30%): Followers looking for free advice or a place to vent. This is a very common type of blog audience. Even if they do not plan to purchase therapy services yet, they represent a strong target for low-ticket tripwires (e.g., $10 workbooks).

What does this mean for strategy? The current model is cost-effective for each individual customer, but it is not structurally scalable. Therefore, it is necessary to move to a multi-tiered structure to cover the opportunity costs associated with losing 900 potential customers.

2.3. USER RESEARCH AND CUSTOMER PERSONAS (QUALITATIVE)

To better comprehend customer behavior behind the presented numbers, was used a digital ethnography (see Appendix B). Based on the results from internal CRM data and sociological research, the audience branches into two distinct segments, to align these personas with the future product strategy, their behavioral characteristics and financial conditions listed below (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1. Behavioral Characteristics and Financial Conditions of Target Personas

Attribute	Persona 1: The "Lost Client" (Local Mass Market)	Persona 2: The "Premium Client" (Expat Market)
Role in Current Model	Absolute majority of the audience, currently brings zero profit.	Core revenue driver of the "Solo Expert" model.

Demographics & Occupation	Women aged 28-45 residing in Ukraine (mid-level managers, teachers, beauty industry, young mothers).	Highly successful Ukrainian women aged 30-50. Expatriates in the EU/USA (IT, top managers).
Core Pain Points	Generalized anxiety, unresolved childhood resentments, toxic family dynamics, emotional burnout.	Deep loneliness of emigration and homesickness (46%), identity crises, intense stress due to separation from family (36%), and high anxiety regarding future uncertainty (30%) (Center for Economic Strategy).
Financial Limitations	Strict mental health budget ($20-$50/month). Highly price-sensitive.	Financial cost is not a barrier ($150+ per session is highly acceptable).
Purchase Scenario	Impulsive, driven by "trigger events". Most likely to buy low-cost async courses (EdTech) or tangible tools (journals).	Resist formal therapy in host countries ("refugee denial paradox"). Seek long-term, high-touch "Executive Mentorship" and a native "cultural match".
Voice of the Customer	"Frankly, the price is quite high... As soon as I have the opportunity financially, I will write."	"I need someone close in mentality. I cannot explain my problems to local psychologists here, they are too formal..."

Source: Made by the author based on internal CRM data and digital ethnography.

What this means for strategy: This big difference in purchasing power and psychological needs directly justifies the need for a multi-tiered service architecture, applying a single service model to both segments leads to failure.

2.4. MARKET AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (SECONDARY AND QUANTITATIVE)

This section provides an analysis of secondary sociological reports, macroeconomic assessments, legislative updates, and internal financial indicators. This is done to confirm the business's long-term viability.

2.4.1. MACRO-MARKET SIZING, ECONOMIC IMPACT, AND THE "HELP GAP"

The Ukrainian mental health market is currently experiencing unprecedented demand, driven by the ongoing war. Today, psychological support is not just a niche service, but a critical national necessity. According to estimates from the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, approximately 15 million Ukrainians will require psychological support (Ministry of Health of Ukraine). It is represent a massive Total Addressable Market (TAM). The World Health Organization further estimates, that nearly 10 million Ukrainians are potentially at risk of developing severe clinical disorders, including depression, PTSD, and panic attacks (World Health Organization).

The macroeconomic impact of this crisis is huge. According to the World Bank, the economic cost of lost productivity due to common mental disorders in Ukraine (2017–2030) is estimated at over $800 million for depression and $350 million for anxiety. Also, every $1 invested in expanding mental health treatments in Ukraine generates $2 in restored economic productivity (World Bank).

Despite this critical need, a big "Help Gap" exists. A survey conducted by Gradus Research in 2023 found a clear paradox: in this survey, 42% of respondents acknowledged that they needed psychological help, but only 5% of them actually went to get it. One more detailed sociological study by Gradus Research (January 2024) confirms the existence of this gap, quantifying a "Help Gap" of 32%. This gap is primarily caused by three obstacles:

Financial Barrier (23%): Traditional therapy is perceived as too expensive.

Stigma (29%): Individuals do not consider their problems "serious enough".

Trust Barrier (20%): Consumers fear charlatans and lack trust in unknown specialists (Gradus Research).

Even under these circumstances public readiness is growing: by 2025, over 260,000 Ukrainians received primary psychosocial support (Ministry of Health of Ukraine). Also, this crisis is no less serious for displaced persons living abroad, according to the Center for Economic

Strategy (2026), 46% of Ukrainian refugees suffer from severe homesickness, and 36% experience high levels of stress due to separation from loved people (Center for Economic Strategy). And it further complicates their psychological integration, and increases the “denial paradox.”

What this means for strategy: This indicates the existence of a significant underserved market segment related specifically to trust and accessibility. A product that addresses both of these issues has a significant advantage in the market.

2.4.2. COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE AND CAPITALIZATION

According to forecasts, the global mental health services market is expected to exceed $475 billion by 2027 (New Market Pitch). In Ukraine, the market is making attempts to meet demand through polarized models, and this leaves a “gap” for RUDNYTSKA.SPACE (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. Competitive Landscape and Capitalization in the Ukrainian Mental Health Market

Competitor Category	Key Players / Examples	Core Offering & Model	Strategic Weakness
Venture-Backed Aggregators & AI	Venture-Backed Aggregators & AI Mindly ($2M funding) (AIN.ua), Pleso ($1.2M) (Forbes Ukraine), Clearly AI (€1.35M) (dev.ua)	Volume-based B2C/B2B matching, standard pricing, AI bots.	High CAC and a persistent "trust deficit" due to anonymous algorithms.
Mass Market "Pop Psychology"	Natalia Kholodenko	Show-format mass courses. Highly accessible.	Lacks deep, evidence-based clinical methodology.
Premium Mentorship	Yuliia Kravchenko	High-ticket, luxury coaching segment.	Entirely inaccessible to the mass consumer.
Direct Niche Competitors	Yuliia Levkovska	Positive Psychotherapy methodology.	Lower brand awareness and audience loyalty.

Source: Author's analysis based on market research.

Strategic Opportunity: RUDNYTSKA.SPACE is in a unique position to fill the “affordable depth” niche. It combines clinical quality (which helps overcome the trust barrier) with EdTech formats (which helps overcome the price barrier), and can capture 32% of the untapped market (Gradus Research). In addition, 50% growth in corporate (B2B) programs opens up a promising channel for business expansion (Deloitte Ukraine).

What this means for strategy: There is a clear "white space" in the market. The ecosystem does not need to compete with tech giants on tech, or fight in a price war, it must compete on curated trust.

2.4.3. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS (PORTER’S 5 FORCES)

To systematically evaluate the competitive intensity and market attractiveness of the mental health sector in Ukraine, was made the Porter’s Five Forces analysis (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3. Industry Analysis Based on Porter’s Five Forces Framework

Force	Intensity	Consequence & Strategic Action
Threat of New Entrants	Decreasing to Low	The 2025 mandatory certification law eradicates the "gray zone" of unqualified practitioners, favoring legally compliant entities partnered with official institutes (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).
Competitive Rivalry	High	Major aggregators have big marketing budgets, and it is impossible to win direct price war with them. Instead of this, company must compete through its unique value proposition: offer a carefully curated team, supported by personal brand trust.
Threat of Substitutes	High	AI-powered therapy bots are getting more popular, so the startup should emphasize its brand’s human-centered approach. Recent clinical studies in 2025 revealed a significant “authorship bias”—over 93% of users prefer support they perceive as expert-provided (Föyen et al.). This benefits the company.

Bargaining Power of Suppliers	Low	The business holds strong negotiating power to set strict quality standards and dictate favorable commission rates (e.g., 30%) for hired psychologists.
Bargaining Power of Buyers	High	Local consumers are highly price-sensitive, requiring a strict product ladder to match diverse budget expectations.

Source: Based on macro-environmental analysis.

What this means for strategy: Because of the strong bargaining power of buyers and strong competition, it is better to avoid direct price wars. Instead, it is better to create a clearly differentiated ecosystem built around the brand.

2.5. STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS (SWOT)

Based on the results of an internal operational audit and an external analysis of the macroenvironment, a SWOT matrix was developed (see Fig. 2.1). This framework logically establishes the basis for the future scaling strategy.



Fig. 2.1 Strategic SWOT Matrix. Own elaboration, 2026.

Strategic Initiatives (Closing the Gap) The transition to the "To-Be" is based on specific strategic initiatives. These initiatives stem directly from the interrelationship between the various components of the SWOT analysis (TOWS logic) (see Fig. 2.2).



Fig. 2.2. Strategic TOWS Alignment (Initiatives Formulation). Own elaboration, 2026.

What this means for strategy: The SWOT Matrix confirms that scale cannot be achieved by simply executing. There must be delegation of execution. A 3 tier product ladder is the most natural and appropriate way to bridge between the physical limit gap (W) and large market demand (O), while leveraging brand trust (S) as a unique competitive advantage.

Chapter 3. The Solution Direction: EdTech Ecosystem Concept

3.1. THE CORE CONCEPT

Currently, the business operates as a sole practice, and all of its revenue comes from the direct work of a single individual. This structure poses a risk from a business perspective. The potential for significant future growth is limited due to its specific characteristics. Therefore, the business needs to transition from a traditional service-oriented model to a product-oriented model, which is capable to generate significant revenue and ensure sustainable development. A key component of transition to a product-based model is developing a "brand driven" ecosystem. The main goal of this new model is to create an ecosystem where users have access to a variety of products and services under a single trusted brand. This is done to ensure that customers don't just pay the founder by the hour, but have the opportunity to choose the type of product that best suits their needs. It is important to distinguish this brand-driven approach from typical online marketplaces. Standard marketplaces usually based on anonymous, algorithmic models focused on large volumes and low costs. Because of this, they suffer from high customer acquisition costs (CAC), and struggle to build consumer trust, because users often skeptical of faceless corporate structures. So, the brand-driven ecosystem capitalizes on an established parasocial relationship created by a well-known personality/brand. A well-known brand supports scaling at the top-of-the-funnel because it serves as a strong attractor. Using this existing warm audience during the launch phase provides a near-zero CAC during the initial launch phase and reduces consumer concerns that they might be deceived by charlatans. However, it is important to note that the nearly zero CAC provided by the existing audience is a short-term benefit typical of an early-stage conversion. When business expands beyond its existing audience and begins attracting new visitors, it will need to turn to performance marketing/paid advertising to drive additional conversions, which will lead to an increase in CAC (as shown in Section 5).

Within this expanded, multi-tiered structure, the founder’s personal brand becomes an advertising resource and a quality control filter for other products and specialists. At the same time, it remains the primary channel for delivering high-quality consulting services. The transition to a platform model does not decrease the value of the founder's personal brand; instead, it reinforces and make it stronger. The implementation of scalable products will transform the founder’s individual consultations into a unique premium service with a luxury feel, which will increase the brand’s overall value. Additionally, the use of scalable products will allow the business to implement effective marketing strategies and attract targeted external traffic, ensuring rapid business growth without creating operational bottlenecks.

3.2. THE PRODUCT LADDER STRATEGY

To successfully implement the concept of a brand-driven ecosystem, a structured three-tier product line was developed. This structure allows the business to reach different customer segments depending on their budget, psychological needs, and urgency. Strategically, this ecosystem is designed to differentiate the brand from free government-provided psychological care, such as the mhGAP primary care programs implemented by the Ministry of Health of Ukraine (Ministry of Health of Ukraine). While the state covers basic clinical needs, the RUDNYTSKA.SPACE ecosystem competes by offering complete confidentiality, emotional connection, and premium user experience free from the stigma, which often associated with official medical institutions.



Fig. 3.1. The RUDNYTSKA.SPACE Ecosystem Product Ladder Architecture; Own elaboration, 2026.

Tier 1 (Edtech, Subscriptions and Tangible Assets / Mass Market)

Tier 1 is designed to capture the lost client segment of consumers who are sensitive to cost and generate scalable mass-market revenue. It also acts as a stigma bypass by providing the opportunity to receive professional help anonymously for those who do not perceive their problems as serious enough to to seek treatment at a clinic.

- Digital Products and Subscriptions: In addition to the already validated "Personal Boundaries" course, there are proprietary stress-reduction programs. As customers have varying levels of disposable income, pricing is highly segmented. It ranges from a very basic asynchronous package priced at $10; a longer program with additional resources priced at $20-$50; and a curated package priced at $150-$300 which includes homework checking and personal guidance from a team psychologist.
- Monthly Subscription Model (MRR): In order to close the considerable gap in pricing between a $50 course and a personal consultation costing $150+, will be introduced a "Closed Psychological Support Club". The monthly recurring revenue (MRR) for this product will range from $15-$25. This subscription will be part of an entry-level ecosystem designed to attract a mass-market audience. It will serve as a predictable source of recurring revenue within the financial model. As a key customer retention mechanism, the subscription allows to keep clients who have completed the course engaged with the brand through weekly webinars, Q&A sessions, and mutual support groups. This keeps them interested until they have the financial ability and psychological readiness for individual therapy.
- Tangible Brand Extensions: Additionally, seasonal physical products such as therapeutic journals will be introduced, providing a material representation of the brand. These products

generate user-generated content and function as low-cost tripwires that encourage initial purchase.

Strategic Alignment: Tier 1

- Target market segment: Persona 1 ("The Lost Client" / Local Mass Market B2C).
- Problem it solves: The high financial barrier to entry and the internal social stigma regarding formal clinical therapy.
- What business metric it improves: Recovers lost leads, significantly lowers blended Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC), and generates baseline Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR).
- What implementation risk it creates: Potential brand devaluation if course quality is low, and high churn rates inside the subscription club model.

Tier 2 (Marketplace / Mid Market): Curated Team and B2b Corporate Packages

To overcome the physical capacity constraints of the solo-founder model, the ecosystem established a curated marketplace of hired psychologists who meet the requirements of the new 2025 Mental Health Care System Law (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). The specialists are recruited exclusively from an academic partnership with the Ukrainian Institute of Positive Psychotherapy (UIPP). The target price for a B2C session is set dynamically between 1000 and 1800 UAH.

- B2B Corporate Wellbeing Packages: The team's scalability allows company to expand its audience from current Instagram users in the B2C segment to the corporate sector. The ecosystem can capitalize the 50% growth in demand for mental health support services in the corporate sector, and offer structured wellness service packages to leading Ukrainian IT and financial companies (Deloitte Ukraine). It will create a stable and significant revenue stream in the B2B segment. It is important to note: While Tier 1 and Tier 3 serve the existing audience profiles identified in the digital ethnography (Personas 1 & 2), Tier 2 opens a completely new B2B expansion segment targeting Corporate HRs.

- AI Defense & Business Model: The platform will operate on a flat commission rate of 30% per session. The brand has a strong competitive advantage against massive market aggregators that often retain 100% of the fee from a new client's first session as a CAC recovery mechanism. The ecosystem allows psychologists to earn money in their very first session with clients due to organic traffic and lower initial CAC. While fairly paying specialists is designed to build high supplier loyalty, it reduces one common problem in the marketplace where psychologists move clients to the grey market outside the platform. Also, to avoid threats of emerging AI-therapy startups, the platform will emphasize its human-centric approach. Recent clinical trials (Föyen et al.) demonstrated that while AI can generate technically proficient advice, over 93% of users prefer support they perceive to be expert-authored due to a profound "authorship bias (Föyen et al.). This proves that clients by nature seek real human empathy, sincerity, and a real therapeutic alliance, which anonymous AI bots cannot replicate.

To get trust transfer from the founder to the team, quality control systems are established for quality assurance. This is done by means of weekly supervision sessions with the team, analysis of complex client cases on a regular basis, as well as providing external educational materials for staff. Also, a strong service level agreement (SLA) will be provided to the client. If the client is not satisfied with their first session with a specialist, the platform will provide one free replacement session with another team member. This helps reduce the feeling of risk when interacting with a new specialist and gives the user confidence in their choice.

Strategic alignment: Tier 2

- Target market segment: Persona 1 (warm mid-market B2C) and the new B2B expansion segment (corporate HR)
- Problem it solves: The physical capacity bottleneck of the founder (100 sessions max) and common consumer fear of charlatans on anonymous platforms.

- Business metric that it improves: Unlocks Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) scalability, multiplies total available capacity (sessions/month), also creates high-LTV B2B retainers.
- Implementation risk it creates: Platform leakage (psychologists take clients outside the platform). Also centralized reputational risk for whole ecosystem, if somebody of team members violates ethical/medical standards.

Tier 3 (Expert/High-End): Premium Mentorship

Premium mentoring and comprehensive solutions for clients are offered as a top-tier service. This tier guarantees exclusive access to the founder's time and maximizes revenue potential.

- High-ticket educational mentorship ($400–$1000+): The founder will provide a 5-8 week program which will include exclusive mentorship from the founder, small group mastermind experience, and messaging support. This format provides the highest Lifetime Value. However, it is also partially scalable, but better compared to one-on-one mentoring sessions.
- Executive support/premium mentorship (individual sessions) ($150+/session): Will be introduced a strict limit of only 10 individual consultation sessions per month. Level 3 was developed to address the "denial paradox" which is common among the majority of expats. They have historically demonstrated unwillingness to seek traditional mental health services due to their professional status. Therefore, Tier 3 is positioned as an executive support/premium mentorship option to address this resistance.
- Mitigation of downgrade risk: It is possible that customers who have purchased premium-level services will try to reduce costs by switching to Level 2. To avoid losses due to cannibalization of Level 3 sales, there will be a clear differentiation between the psychological issues each level can address. Level 2 will address the majority of psychological issues, such as general anxiety, common relationship problems, and burnout. Level 3 will primarily address complex trauma, executive business mentorship, and serious identity crises. This approach will justify premium pricing based on unique methodological

expertise rather than just brand popularity. In this way, the system will prevent audience overlap.

Strategic alignment: Tier 3

- Target market segment: Persona 2 (“The Premium Expat” / high-end B2C).
- Problem it solves: The “denial paradox” (resistance to medical therapy) among wealthy expatriates requiring cultural matching and high-status support.
- What business metric it improves: Increases the effective hourly rate of the founder, also provides inelastic and high-margin revenue resistant to economic downturns.
- What implementation risk it creates: Founder burnout if the strict limit on VIP sessions (max 10 sessions/month) is violated, or product cannibalization if differentiation from Tier 2 is unclear.

Ecosystem Retention and Advanced Sales Funnels

The overall value of this information-based "info-business" ecosystem is derived from the structural design of the informational architecture. To make the most effective use of the three-tier product structure in order to maximize customer lifetime value (LTV) and minimize customer churn, the ecosystem uses a complex automated sales system. The tiers are interconnected and have particular digital marketing triggers specifically designed to align with the unique characteristics of the mental health services market (see Fig. 3.2).



Fig. 3.2. Customer Journey: Integrating the 3-Tier Product Ladder for Maximum Lifetime Value; Own elaboration, 2026.

1 & 2. Top of Funnel and Low-Friction Entry (Tier 1): The typical experience of the client usually starts with either organic content or a complimentary lead magnet which creates some level of initial trust. The lead magnet will most likely be followed by a low-friction "tripwire" entry point where customers can make a small purchase. This could be a basic asynchronous course priced from $10–$50. By lowering both the initial psychological barrier and the financial cost associated with entering into formal therapy, the trust is established with target audience.

3 & 4. Automated Trigger and Core Monetization (Tier 2): Once a customer completes a Tier 1 course, their emotional state is more stabilized, and brand trust is powered. Additionally, the customer has strengthened their relationship with the brand. Once the customer completes a Tier 1 course, the LMS platform will automatically create an upsell trigger to promote a higher-priced item. Typically, it would be either a post-course assessment or a matching quiz paired with a discounted offer (e.g., 50% off the first session) to book the client into Tier 2 (Team Therapy), which is essentially the primary revenue stream of the platform and captures nearly all of the available market demand at a price of 1000-1800 UAH per session (see Section 5.1).

5. Premium Escalation (Expert / High End - Tier 3): The funnel was developed in the way to filter and escalate clients. While Tier 2 takes in the vast majority of the audience, the more involved clients who struggle with complex traumas or expats who want exclusive cultural matching are filtered upwards to Tier 3 (Expert / High End), at prices over $150 per session. Since the founder is limited in terms of how much work they can take on, the prior levels of service function as a filtering system. This helps ensure that only those clients who have already demonstrated an interest in working with the founder — by completing the earlier stages of the process — are considered. This avoids the overload associated with having to work with “cold” leads.

6. Ecosystem Lock-In (The Subscription Club): An "enclosure" effect is established through creating a Subscription Club for $15–$25 per month. As shown in the funnel diagram (Fig. 3.2), this retention engine connects to each of the product tiers with pointing arrows. The subscription club offers ongoing support within a community setting for alumni of the products, as well as alumni discounts. It allows clients to continue using the services despite whether they are currently in active therapy (at any of the three different product levels), and providing consistent Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR) for the business (see Section 5.1.4).

3.3. VALUE PROPOSITION DESIGN

To ensure that the newly developed product ladder effectively meets market demand, was applied the Value Proposition Canvas framework (Osterwalder et al.). This strategic tool aligns the functional needs, psychological pains, and expected gains of the separated customer personas with the specific features of the proposed EdTech ecosystem. The visual architecture of this alignment demonstrated on Fig. 3.3.



Fig. 3.3. The “Value Proposition Canvas” model; Author’s own elaboration, 2026.

To provide a comprehensive analysis of the elements presented in the canvas, Table 3.1 below shows a detailed comparison of customer profiles and the B2B segment (jobs, pains, and gains) with the ecosystem's value map (pain relievers and gain creators).

Table 3.1. Detailed Value Proposition Map for the RUDNYTSKA.SPACE Ecosystem

Customer Segment	Customer Pains & Functional Needs	Ecosystem Pain Relievers & Gain Creators
Profile A: The "Lost Client" (Local Mass Market B2C)	Needs: Tools to manage strong anxiety and burnout. Also a structured roadmap for personal improvement and a supportive community. Pains: High financial barrier; strong trust deficit in the mass-market aggregators; internal stigma in the formal therapy, reflecting the 29% of the population who feel their problems are not serious enough for a clinic (Gradus Research).	Stigma & Price Bypass: A low-risk tripwire strategy ($10 courses) lowers financial fear and decrease internal stigma, allowing users to receive professional help anonymously. Trust Shield: Strict academic curation through the Institute of Positive Psychotherapy reduce the fear of charlatans. Tangible Gains: Through the EdTech and MRR Club tiers, clients receive tangible assets and community validation.
Profile B: The "Premium Expat" (High-End B2C)	Needs: Overcome deep loneliness of emigration and severe identity crises; high-status executive support; immediate emotional connection and a shared cultural mentality. Pains: The denial paradox (while 51% of refugees experience depressive states, only 14% are willing to admit it) (PAQ Research); rejection of formal psychiatric treatment; acute cultural mismatch with local foreign therapists. Financial cost is not a barrier.	The Denial Bypass: Positioning high-level sessions as “premium mentoring” makes it possible to directly bypass the “denial paradox” and ensure the desired cultural compatibility, removing resistance to psychological treatment. Human-Centric Advantage: In an era increasingly dominated by emerging AI-therapy startups, the ecosystem guarantees a supervised, human-centric approach. Supported by 2025 clinical trials demonstrating a massive "authorship bias"—where over 93% of clients prefer psychological advice they perceive to come from a human expert rather than a machine—this approach provides a profound

		emotional gain for clients seeking genuine empathy and authentic emotional involvement (Föyen et al.).
B2B Segment: Corporate Decision Maker (HR)	Needs: Solutions to maintain team productivity; a high return on investment (ROI); formalized wellbeing packages compliant with 2025 regulatory standards (Ministry of Health of Ukraine). Pains: Loss of revenue due to employee burnout, directly reflecting economic estimations of lost productivity (World Bank); administrative burden of sourcing legally compliant mental health providers.	Compliance Shield: The strict academic curation through the Institute of Positive Psychotherapy serves as a protection against violations, alleviating legal risks for corporate clients. Macroeconomic ROI Generation: Aims to address macroeconomic challenges by demonstrating that investments in mental health lead to a significant increase in business productivity (World Bank).

Source: Own elaboration based on synthesized market research.

3.3.3. ACCESSIBILITY/QUALITY PROBLEM RESOLUTION AND CRITICAL THINKING

The largest obstacle confronting the mental health services market is the widespread opinion that low-cost mental health service providers lack professional experience and therefore cannot produce a high-quality therapy experience. The proposed ecosystem solves the accessibility/quality problem using brand trust transfer. Brand equity is being transferred from the premium tier to the mid-tier, providing a significant relative advantage compared to competition in the field of mental health services, thus reducing the perceived risk for potential customers.

Limitations to Brand Trust Transfer: While preliminary validation signals (further explored in Chapter 4) suggest that many patients are willing to receive care from curated team specialists, there are inherent limitations to the brand trust transfer mechanism. These limitations includee:

- Many people who have experienced extremely traumatic events do not trust or accept delegated care from team specialists. In order for those clients to develop a sense of emotional safety, they need to perceive their caregivers as having the highest level of authority.
- Parasocial relationships have resulted from social media, allowing clients to create illusions about forming a personal relationship with a provider. Those purchasing products based on these types of social connections are paying for the provider's personality, not simply the methods of treatment applied.
- High-net-worth individuals work directly with the provider because it serves as a status symbol. The proposed ecosystem uses brand trust transfer as a filtering process, so the founder works only with high-risk clients and/or complex cases.

Chapter 4. Validation and Experiments (Iterative Learning Cycles)

The proposed EdTech ecosystem will be built empirically on demand rather than based on assumptions just to develop a hypothetical product ladder. Thus, a set of experiments were developed with the purpose of validating the major hypotheses regarding each tier of the product ladder. Because the study utilizes the existing brand community (with more than 93,000 followers) as a live lab for testing the validity of these hypotheses, speculative forecasting has been avoided by utilizing quantitative transactional data and client behavior.

4.1. RETROSPECTIVE VALIDATION: SUBSTITUTION EFFECT (TIER 1)

The central premise for Tier 1's EdTech ecosystem is that a less expensive digital product can be a viable alternative to higher-priced one-on-one therapy, especially for price-sensitive consumers who cannot afford such services (see Section 2.2). A retrospective validation analysis was conducted to test this hypothesis using the financial and behavioral data collected during the initial pilot run of the "Personal Boundaries" asynchronous course.

This product was launched as a tripwire and sold for 890 UAH. All marketing efforts were organic; paid advertising was not used. A structured digital sales funnel was created based on Instagram Stories. This consisted of a week-long educational pre-launch warm-up sequence. After the weekly series of educational posts was completed, users were redirected to a special landing page optimized for conversion. Traffic was directed straight to the landing page during the ten-day campaign period.

A multi-channel payment system was implemented to simplify the payment process for various user groups. The first channel was a payment gateway located on the landing page (WayForPay). The second channel permitted users to pay via manual bank transfers. The total transactional data from all payment channels indicates that 127 successful transactions occurred within this timeframe, generating 113,030 UAH in gross revenue (see Appendix C for a comprehensive breakdown of financial results).

Direct capital expenditures related to customer acquisition during this launch were zero. However, the economic model must account for the founder’s time spent creating organic content for social media. The main operating expense related to this product was a two-month subscription to the Softbook learning management system (LMS), costing approximately 7,476 UAH.

Because there were no paid advertising costs, and little cost associated with digital infrastructure, the financial Return on Investment (ROI) for this product was approximately 1,411% under early-stage organic conditions, or roughly 14.1 times what was spent. It should be noted that this number represents the early-stage conditions where there are no paid acquisition activities involved. Therefore, this calculation does not include the opportunity cost of the founder's time spent on creating organic content, as well as any additional scale-up costs including paid performance marketing and staff additions. However, this ROI reflects early-stage organic conditions and is expected to normalize once the system begins to scale and paid acquisition is introduced (see Section 5.1).

Behavioral Validation and Cohort Overlap: although the gross revenue demonstrates the product's viability, the primary strategy was to confirm that this product is capturing unmet demand instead of cannibalizing the premium therapy market. A method for verifying the source of the demand using a qualitative data comparison process was implemented. Each of the 127 course purchasers' social media usernames was manually cross-referenced against an internal direct message database of prior rejected lead inquiries.

The results indicate an important business insight: approximately 60% of the course buyers appear to be individuals that had previously inquired about personal therapy, but decided not to proceed because of the 4,000 UAH consultation price.

Table 4.1. Validation Summary: EdTech Substitution Effect

Parameter	Description

Hypothesis	Lower-cost digital products can viably substitute high-priced 1-on-1 therapy for price-sensitive consumers.
Method	Retrospective analysis of financial and behavioral data from a pilot launch of an asynchronous course (890 UAH) using organic Instagram traffic.
Observed Result	127 organic sales generated 113,030 UAH. Cross-referencing revealed ~60% of buyers were previously priced-out therapy leads.
Business Implication	Validates Tier 1 ability to capture and monetize "lost clients" without cannibalizing the premium tier, significantly expanding the Total Addressable Market (TAM).
Limitation	Validated only on a "warm" organic audience; paid CAC scalability and performance on cold traffic remain untested.

4.2. PROSPECTIVE VALIDATION PLAN: THE MARKETPLACE CONCEPT (TIER 2 B2C)

The Tier 2 marketplace uses a "Brand Trust Transfer" assumption as its foundation; the assumption being that the large, loyal audience that follows the founder's personal brand will also use junior or mid-level therapists once the founder has approved

those therapists and taken responsibility as their clinical supervisor and quality control (see Section 3.1). The first part of a sequential, two-stage experimental study was conducted in February 2026 to test this hypothesis.

In evaluating potential demand, there is a need to make a distinction among various degrees of customer engagement: total inquiries (emotional/informational messages), individuals indicating an expressed interest in using the service (therapy-intent users), and potential customers who have demonstrated both interest in the service and the ability to pay (qualified leads). Broader audience metrics do not directly represent ready-to-convert demand. However, these can serve as directional upper bounds if conservative assumptions regarding conversion rates are applied to account for variability in user intent. In this framework, the total volume of inbound interactions is saved as a reference base, but the applied conversion rate is intentionally reduced to reflect only a subset of users with actual therapy intent.

4.2.1. EXPERIMENT 2: PRICE SENSITIVITY & TRUST TRANSFER SURVEY

A survey-based experiment was developed to see if users were psychologically prepared to accept delegated care. A survey experiment was performed using Instagram Stories to measure the intentions of the organic audience and eliminate the "charlatan fear" before allocating money for recruiting and onboarding a team of psychologists.

Engagement, funnel rate and acceptance level data: there were 1,028-1,042 organic viewers of the survey within a 24 hour time frame. These viewers were directly approached about their willingness to work with an approved group of experts who would be supervised by the founder. There were very high levels of engagement as 104 viewers participated in the poll, providing indicative rather than statistically representative results.

Of the total number of respondents, 82% (or 85 of 104) stated they would be willing to receive therapy from the team of specialists, indicating strong directional support for the concept. Conversely, 18% (or 19 of 104) stated that they only want to meet with the founder. For purposes of the business model, the 18% refusal rate is beneficial because it identifies the inelastic premium segment (Persona 2), which will provide sustainability for the higher ticket tiered services (the Veblen good effect).

Table 4.2. Validation Summary: Trust Transfer Survey

Parameter	Description
Hypothesis	The founder's loyal audience will accept delegated care from junior/mid-level therapists if they are approved and supervised by the founder.
Method	Interactive Instagram Stories survey targeting the existing follower base (104 respondents from ~1,027 viewers).

Observed Result	82% of respondents expressed willingness to work with the team; 18% wanted exclusively with the founder.
Business Implication	Strong empirical support for the "Brand Trust Transfer" mechanism. It justifies the investment into recruiting a Tier 2 team. The 18% validates a separated inelastic Tier 3 market.
Limitation	Measures stated intent, which does not always perfectly translate into actual purchasing behavior.

4.2.2. EXPERIMENT 3: THE WAITLIST TEST (CONCIERGE MVP)

To move from just interest in the service to demonstrating commercial intent, a concierge minimum viable product (MVP) was created shortly after the survey was completed. All participants were asked to complete a formal wait list registration form. To stimulate conversions and obtain accurate data on demand, for all registered users were offered priority booking and a 50% discount for the first consultation with a team specialist. The use of this methodology produced 41 high quality leads into the system.

Quantitative data obtained from these registrations was carefully analyzed and graphically illustrated to identify the existing gap in demand across three key areas (see Fig. 4.1 for the graphic illustration).



Fig. 4.1. A visual representation of the demand profile generated through the use of the Concierge MVP (n = 41); Own development, 2026.

An analysis of the dashboard (see Fig. 4.1) suggests several strategic conclusions. First, the majority of individuals on the waiting list have a limited budget typical of the mass and mid-market segments (less than 1,500 UAH). Second, the most preferred formats for these clients closely align with those that increase lifetime value (LTV). Approximately 70.7% of respondents indicated that they prefer long-term, regular therapy sessions rather than individual sessions.

There is additional data which support the main “brand orientation” hypothesis. Personal endorsement/recommendation/supervision by the founder (68.3%) was mentioned as the main reason for choosing a specific team member. Price/affordability (63.4%) ranked second. In addition, respondents demonstrated a high level of “brand loyalty.” 61.0% of respondents used the different blog’s content to help resolve various psychological issues, while 0% reported using other third-party aggregators (such as Mindly or Rozmova) to seek similar assistance. These data indicate a general lack of trust in competitors’ anonymous solutions and, consequently, provide a significant relative competitive advantage to the RUDNYTSKA.SPACE ecosystem.

The conversion of 41 fully registered leads from the waitlist indicates significant commercial interest in Level 2 products. Specifically, 51.2% of participants (21 users) expressed their intention to make a reservation immediately or in the near future. Survey results shows that 70.7% of the respondents (15 users) interested in long-term therapy packages, while 29.3% (6 users) prefer a one-time consultation. Assuming a minimum starting price of 1,000 UAH per session and a standard monthly package of 4 sessions, this single cohort represents an initial order portfolio value of approximately 66,000 UAH (60,000 UAH from packages and 6,000 UAH from individual sessions).

While Section 5 details a comprehensive financial model with higher target average check amounts, this specific pilot metric successfully confirms that the Tier 2 market concept has immediate, monetizable traction.

As such, this provides a reasonable basis to proceed with hiring the first team members with relatively low initial risk.

Table 4.3. Validation Summary: The Waitlist MVP

Parameter	Description
Hypothesis	Stated interest in team therapy will convert into concrete commercial intent when presented with a booking opportunity.
Method	A concierge MVP waitlist offering a 50% discount on the first session, requiring formal registration and preference selection.
Observed Result	Successful acquisition of 41 high-quality leads across the full engagement funnel, demonstrating clear commercial interest and qualified demand.
Business Implication	Confirms sufficient initial demand to safely hire the first cohort of specialists with low financial risk, while indicating a high-retention client profile.
Limitation	Operational capacity, scheduling friction, and long-term retention dynamics at scale remain unvalidated.

4.3. FUTURE VALIDATION: THE CORPORATE WELLBEING MARKET (TIER 2 B2B)

As the company expands its existing scalable business model while responding to increasing B2C demand, expanding the business model into the corporate wellbeing arena is considered to be a priority. It is important to note that validating a B2B marketplace will require an entirely different type of validation architecture compared to the existing B2C Instagram-based user base.

To create an actionable strategy for developing the planned B2B offerings, a future validation plan has been developed to assess the viability of offering Corporate Wellbeing

Packages. To prepare for this new phase, structured CustDev interviews will be conducted with HR Directors and Operations Managers working in Ukraine's IT and Finance Sectors. The objective is to collect data regarding required legal compliance, identify acceptable corporate payment structures (i.e., employee quotas versus flat retainers), and identify optimal formats for providing group psychoeducation content . These studies will ensure that the B2B segment is both fiscally responsible and compliant with employer-sponsored psychosocial programs established in 2025.

Table 4.4. Validation Summary: Future B2B Validation

Parameter	Description
Hypothesis	The platform's approved team and compliance standards can fulfill corporate HR needs for employee wellbeing programs.
Method	Structured Customer Development (CustDev) interviews with HR Directors and Operations Managers in the IT and Finance sectors.
Expected Result	Clarification of acceptable B2B payment structures (quotas vs. retainers) and mandatory legal compliance requirements.
Business Implication	Will ensure that the B2B segment is legally compliant and financially viable before formal market entry and resource allocation.
Limitation	Currently entirely theoretical; B2B sales cycles are typically longer and require vastly different acquisition strategies than B2C.

Chapter 5. Business model, operations and economic justification

To provide for sustainable development of the proposed Ecosystem for Education Technology over the long term, it is required to develop a suitable economic and operational system. This chapter shows structural transformation of a limited in terms of capacity individual work into a diverse platform with details on how pricing will be set up and how operational management, personnel distribution and legal compliance will be managed.

5.1. PRICING POLICY AND FORECAST OF SALES VOLUMES

Viability of the proposed Ecosystem for Education Technology economically depends upon the multilevel pricing strategy that provides access to various parts of the target market - from common mass-consumers to High Net Worth Individuals.

To ensure the financial model is defensible and transparent, the underlying inputs have been separated into empirically validated metrics (derived from Chapter 4 experiments) and benchmark-based assumptions (derived from market standards). This distinction is outlined in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Key Economic Assumptions: Validated vs. Benchmark-Based

Assumption Category	Metric	Source / Rationale
Validated Inputs (Empirically tested)	Tier 1 EdTech Demand	Validated via 127 organic sales pilot.
	Brand Trust Transfer (B2C)	Validated via 82% acceptance rate in survey and 41 Waitlist leads.
	Premium Expat Demand	Validated by existing historical solo-practice capacity constraints.
Benchmark Inputs (Modeled for scale)	Tier 1 Paid CAC (~$10)	Meta Ads benchmarks for the Ukrainian info-business market (Adamigo).
	Marketplace CAC (~$25)	Conservative estimate due to higher psychological barriers compared to EdTech (Brighter Click).

	Client LTV (8 sessions)	Baseline assumption; requires strict onboarding and quality control to maintain.

Source: *Own elaboration based on internal pilot data and industry benchmarks.*

5.1.1. TIER 1: EDTECH PRODUCT LINE (FOUR LAUNCHES PER YEAR)

Structurally there will be four launches per year for maintaining high level of involvement of the audience, but avoid "burn-out" of staff due to excessive workload. For each launch, sales will be separated in two sections - conversions (organic), and acquisition (paid). Acquisitions (paid) will occur based on a $3000 performance marketing budget per launch or about $1000 per month (~40,000 UAH) per month.

The median Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) of Tier 1 EdTech is set in the initial financial forecasting models at $10 (approximately 400 UAH). The CAC was developed by taking indicative Meta Ads benchmark prices from industry reports and marketing agencies, which serve as the most accessible benchmarks for digital advertising costs in emerging markets such as Ukraine. On a global scale, the average Cost Per Lead (CPL) in the education sector sits between $7 and $12 (Adamigo). Historically, the cost of an ad impression or click in Ukraine has been about one-quarter of the cost of those same actions in Western markets (Adamigo). As such, when considering a local lead-generation strategy using digital advertising methods, the cost to generate one lead can be $1.50-$2.50. Applying a standard funnel conversion rate of 15–20% for a low-cost digital product results in a final acquisition cost of approximately $10 per paying user (Woborders Agency). Seasonal fluctuations and campaign-specific changes will create variations, but this base case provides a stable and reasonably conservative starting point for building out the financial model.

Table 5.2. Tier 1 EdTech Revenue Projection (Per Launch)

Package Tier & Format	Price Point	Organic Vol.	Paid Vol.	Total Vol.	Projected Gross Revenue
Basic Package (Asynchronous access)	$20 (~800 UAH)	~200 sales	~200 sales	400 sales	320,000 UAH
Extended Package (Course + closed community)	$40 (~1,600 UAH)	~100 sales	~100 sales	200 sales	320,000 UAH
Curator Package (Synchronous + homework)	$150 (~6,000 UAH)	15-30 sales (Median: 22)	N/A (Organic focus)	22 sales	132,000 UAH
VIP Mentorship (Direct founder mentorship)	$1,000 (~40,000 UAH)	2-5 sales (Median: 3)	N/A (Organic focus)	3 sales	120,000 UAH
TOTAL (Per Launch)				625 sales	892,000 UAH

Source: Own elaboration based on piloted demand metrics and regional advertising benchmarks.

The table above has been created as an own elaboration with respect to baseline mathematical assumptions and expected share of acquisition in the modelled unit economics. Taking into consideration that same baseline numbers and channel metrics, one quarterly launch would generate about 892,000 UAH in Gross Revenue. Over a three month operational cycle, the gross revenue is expected of about 297,333 UAH per month.

5.1.2. BRAND CONTACT POINTS - PHYSICAL PRODUCTS

The physical products will be integrated via four annual seasonal launches (i.e. New Years Intention Journal).

- Price Determination: The retail price will be set at 300 UAH. Production Costs: Printing estimated at 150 UAH and packaging materials estimated at 30 UAH, making total Cost Of Goods Sold per product of 180 UAH.

- Forecast & Realism: Each launch is limited to 100 units creating perceived deficit.. Producing 100 units costs 18,000 UAH, and selling them generates 30,000 UAH. Spread out over three months, this equates to 10,000 UAH gross revenue and 6,000 UAH COGS per month. It is also accounted an average 5% return or failure rate, which is essentially absorbed by logistical buffer expenses. Thus, the net monthly income will be approximately 4,000 UAH. This product will primarily be used to strengthen brand recognition and increase customer loyalty, so it should not be considered as the main source of income.

5.1.3. TIER 2: B2C MARKETPLACE AND UNIT ECONOMICS

Marketplace Economics: In terms of marketplace economics, it is assumed that the Marketplace charges a flat 30% commission for each transaction. If a session is priced at 1500 UAH then the marketplace will capture 450 UAH. Since this per-session margin serves as the basis for calculating lifetime value (LTV), it must cover both operating costs and marketing expenses across the entire customer lifecycle. That's why the top priority is to compare the customer acquisition cost (CAC) with the total expected LTV generated by these regular transactions of 450 UAH, and not to focus on profitability per session.

Forecast (Organic Acquisition): Historically, the solo practice discarded roughly 900 unmonetized leads every month. Applying a tested baseline conversion rate (CVR) of 3.2% to this entire group yields approximately 29 organic marketplace customers per month. It is important to apply this 3.2% rate directly to the gross total of 900 leads rather than filtering them first. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, this historical conversion metric already accounts for the reality that only a fraction of initial inquiries carry actual purchasing intent. Calculating the forecast this way prevents "double-discounting" the funnel and keeps the 29-client estimate strictly grounded in actual behavioral data.

Forecast (Paid Acquisition): The Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) for the Tier 2 marketplace is conservatively forecasted at $25 (approximately 1,000 UAH). The CAC model takes into account the lower-cost digital advertising environment of the Ukrainian market relative to international telehealth CAC benchmarks. Telehealth CAC internationally ranges from $150 to $300 (Bask Health), but due to the lower costs associated with digital advertising in Ukraine compared to Western markets, generating a targeted service lead locally can be achieved for approximately $4 to $5. However, generating a lead does not guarantee a booking. Booking therapy involves significant psychological friction; clients are often hesitant to engage with an unfamiliar specialist. As such, this friction typically reduces conversion rates. The proposed ecosystem addresses this issue through utilization of the founder's pre-established reputation. It transfers brand trust, minimizing clients' fear of charlatans and maintaining a 15–20% lead-to-booking conversion rate (CVR). Thus, assuming a 20% CVR and a $5 cost per lead, the resulting CAC is approximately $25. With an additional 40 paid Marketplace customers added on a monthly basis due to a committed monthly budget of 40,000 UAH, this creates a total of 69 new customers on a monthly basis.

Formalizing Lifetime Value (LTV) and Effective Margin: A typical client life cycle assumes 8 sessions (about two months). However, while the nominal commission rate is 30%, the exact model must account for the unaccounted-for costs that will occur during the platform's operations. Losses due to no shows, mid-cycle loss, refunds, and subsidies for inactive therapists reduce the effective net platform margin down to 20% (300 UAH per session).

Therefore, the true platform LTV can be defined as follows:

$$LTV = P * S * m\_eff$$

(Where P = Price per session [1500 UAH], S = Number of Sessions [8] and m_eff = Effective Platform Margin [20%].)

Thus, the Net LTV Per Client is equal to approximately 2400 UAH and represents a modeled average rather than a guaranteed behavioral outcome.

Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) & Efficiency Ratios:

1. CAC (paid) - Marketplace: 1000 UAH. The LTV: Paid CAC Ratio is 2.4 (2400/1000), therefore the Paid Acquisition Cycle is Realistic and Sustainable.
2. CAC (Blended) - Ecosystem: This includes the 29 Organic Customers (with No CAC), thus the Average Blended CAC for Acquiring All 69 Clients is Approximately 580 UAH (40,000 UAH/69). The LTV:Blended CAC Ratio is 4.14 Using the Blended CAC. Blended CAC Is Used as a General Metric to Measure Overall Ecosystem Efficiency; however, Direct Paid CAC is More Accurate When Assessing Pure Marketing Scalability.

Monthly Steady State Volume of Financials:

The Estimated Maximum Monthly Steady-State Number of Active Clients Per Month with a Two-Month Lifecycle for Each New Client Is 138. Since There Are Four Sessions Conducted by Each Client Every Month, the Total Number of Sessions Conducted by All Clients Every Month is Approximately 552. Important thing about the steady-state model, is that this model assumes that every client completes the entire eight-session lifecycle (which takes roughly two months), but many clients stop attending after just a few sessions. This reduces their Effective Lifetime Value (LTV) and increase the Variability in Session Volumes for Any Given Month.

- Monthly Gross Market Place Revenue (GMV): 552 Sessions x 1500 UAH = Approximately 828,000 UAH Per Month.
- Monthly Gross Platform Profit: 552 Sessions x 300 UAH (Effective Margin) = Approximately 165,600 UAH Per Month.

5.1.4. TIER 3: SUBSCRIPTION CLUB AND PREMIUM ANCHOR

- Premium Subscription Club: Premium Telegram Group at Price of $20 per Month (Approximately 800 UAH), and while there are Potential to Have a Stable Base of Subscribers Between 50-80 People (baseline number of subscribers is assumed to be about 65 people), it Will Generate a Total Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR) of Approximately 52,000 UAH. Generally, Products Available Through Telegram Do Not Retain Subscribers

Very Well, therefore, it is assumed that 15 percent of subscribers leave each month and that costs associated with acquiring new subscribers are included in the Process of Maintaining Constant Subscriber Base.

- Anchor of Premium Core: The Founder Offers One-on-One Therapy to up to 10 VIP Clients per Month at a Price of $150 (Approximately 6000 UAH) per session. Therefore, The Monthly Revenue from This Segment Is Approximately 60,000 UAH.

5.1.5. CONDITIONAL UPSIDE: CORPORATE WELL-BEING PACKAGES (TIER 2 B2B)

It is critical to note that the core viability of the proposed ecosystem relies exclusively on B2C operations. However, the ecosystem has the potential to offer Tier 2 B2B subscription packages to corporate customers at an estimated price of 30,000 UAH per month, providing a large B2B Gross Profit Margin of 42.5%.

When considering B2B Models, Sales Cycles in Ukraine can take between 2-6 months and provide larger B2B Customer Acquisition Costs. As well as the normal B2B Risks associated with corporate clients (such as extended contract negotiations, immediate termination of contracts, delayed payment etc.), these factors must be taken into account when managing cash flows. Therefore, the income stream from corporate clients is strictly treated as a Conditional Upside Component of the Model. It has been intentionally excluded from the baseline financial projections to ensure conservative planning and is only reflected in the optimistic sensitivity scenario.

5.2. OPERATION AND HUMAN RESOURCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Strong Operational and HR Foundations are needed to effectively manage growing customer base and avoid the internal risks associated with the Rapid Expansion.

- Ecosystem Operations Manager (40,000 UAH/month): Responsible for directing strategic client routing through the platform. High-Level operational management of the Ecosystem.

- Customer Success Specialist (20,000 UAH/month): Handles frontline customer service, e.g. refund requests, scheduling issues, general client communications.
- Performance Marketing Contractor (40,000 UAH/month): Work on a fixed-fee basis to implement and optimize large-scale paid advertising campaigns.
- Content Creation & Design (25,000 UAH/month): Provides video production and graphic design services needed to create content for courses in educational technology and marketing materials.
- Financial Accountant (4,000 UAH/month): Accountable for tax reporting.
- Head of Therapy (Future Role - Conditional Scaling Hire): In later stages of the ecosystem's expansion and development, a management position will be added to the team to supervise and control the quality of the work, which is handled by the founder at the earlier stages. Once the team grows to approximately 12–15 active psychologists or the number of monthly sessions exceeds 600, this position will become necessary from an operational perspective.

Founder Overload Risk (Mitigate Burnout): Workload can easily exceed sustainable limits with launching new courses, VIP Therapy Sessions, Webinars and Team Supervision. To limit burnout, the founders direct clinical and operational involvement is limited to no more than 15 hours per week. Limiting work hours will require strict delegation of operational responsibility.

5.3. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

- Legal Entity Structure: Ukraine has the appropriate legal structure for all financial transactions in accordance with Ukraine Tax Code for FOP (Third Group) Individual Entrepreneurs. These are individual entrepreneurs that do not exceed an approximate income of 10.1 Million UAH annually at a flat tax rate of 5.0% (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). However, the revenue projections indicate that the ecosystem will be limited by these required by law limits, and therefore, a significant legal restructuring from FOP to LLC will be necessary over time.

- Data Protection / Privacy: Due to the sensitive nature of the information related to mental health, the company is required to maintain a very strong level of confidentiality and compliance to international standards of data protection similar to GDPR.

5.4. FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS, SENSITIVITY & RISK ANALYSIS

Table 5.3. Consolidated Monthly P&L Estimate (Steady-State, B2C Only)

Financial Category	Line Item	Amount (UAH/Month)
Gross Revenue	Tier 1: EdTech Launches (Amortized)	297,333
	Tier 2: B2C Marketplace (Effective Platform Profit)	165,600
	Tier 3: VIP Mentorship & Therapy	60,000
	Tier 1: Subscription Club (MRR)	52,000
	Tier 1: Physical Merchandise (Amortized)	10,000
	Total Gross Revenue	584,933
OPEX & COGS	Marketing (Targetologist Retainer + Ad Spend)	120,000
	HR & Production (Ops Manager, Support, Content, Acc.)	89,000
	Direct COGS (Merchandise Production)	6,000
	Acquiring Fees (2% of recognized revenue base)	11,699
	Infrastructure & Logistics (LMS, Zoom, CRM)	5,000
	Total Pre-Tax Costs (OPEX + COGS)	231,699
Profitability	EBITDA (Pre-Tax Profit)	353,234
	Taxation (FOP 5% Flat Tax + Mandatory CCB)	31,007
	Net Profit	322,227

	Net Profit Margin	55.1%

Source: Own elaboration based on modeled B2C unit economics and forecasted conversion rates.

Financial Notes:

- Digital Processing Fee revenue: the company charges a 2% Digital Processing Fee strictly against its recognized revenue base (584,933 UAH).
- Tax planning and revenue recognition: The company is operating under the FOP (3rd Group) individual entrepreneur structure, which has a 5% flat tax. For the B2C marketplace is used a legal agency contract (договір доручення).This is very important because it means that only 30% of the platform’s commission (165,600 UAH) is considered the company’s actual revenue, rather than the total amount that clients pay to therapists (GMV). Because of this, the total recognized revenue for the whole ecosystem is 584,933 UAH. Tax is calculated simply as 5% of this 584,933 UAH base (which is 29,247 UAH), plus the mandatory unified social contribution (CCB/ЄСВ) of 1,760 UAH. It makes the total monthly tax liability exactly 31,007 UAH.
- Net income/cash flow/margins: After calculating operating expenses, COGS, and taxes from the platform’s gross revenue, the projected monthly net profit is approximately 322,227 UAH. Due to the significant share of digital products with zero marginal cost (e.g., EdTech) and commission-based revenue streams, this margin (55.1%) is structurally sustainable in the early stages of scaling. However, as the platform grows, profitability is expected to decline due to increased customer acquisition costs, expansion of the operational team, and growing infrastructure complexity.

The "Solo vs. Ecosystem" Strategic Trade-offs (Hourly Rate & Capacity):

Historically, the maximum sustainable workload for a private physician has been approximately 80 clinical sessions per month. Under this model, the average net income would be about 302,240 UAH per month, which equates to approximately 3,778 UAH per clinical hour. It is important to note that this historical figure does not account for unpaid time spent on administrative and marketing tasks. It also depends entirely on intensive emotional labor, which significantly limits capacity and creates a high risk of burnout. The proposed EdTech ecosystem model transforms this historical financial model into scalable business capital (see Fig. 5.1).

Fig. 5.1. Strategic trade-off (solo practice vs. EdTech ecosystem, B2C Base Case); Own elaboration, 2026.

This strategic transformation is mathematically beneficial. The amount of time the founder will spend on management will not exceed 15 hours per week (60 hours per month); this limit includes VIP sessions, team leadership, and content creation. If the projected monthly net profit of 322,227 UAH is divided by these 60 hours of work, the average hourly income will be approximately 5,370 UAH. This structurally fair comparison shows that the founder will reduce total working hours by 25%, eliminate the psychological pressure associated with 80 intensive therapy sessions per month, and increase effective hourly profit by 42.1%.

Break-even analysis:

Unit-Economic Break-even Clients ≈ Monthly Fixed Costs / Net Client LTV

To determine the break-even point, a fixed monthly overhead of 134,000 UAH was used (which includes 89,000 UAH for personnel, UAH 40,000 for marketing services, and UAH 5,000 for infrastructure) and divided them by the net LTV per customer, which is UAH 2,400. This means that the model breaks even on the unit-economic basis by acquiring approximately 56 active marketplace customers per month. This is a life-cycle-based break-even point, not a strict monthly cash flow break-even point. In other words, acquiring 56 customers generates enough lifetime value to cover fixed costs for a single month. Since these 2,400 UAH per customer are earned over the course of their typical two-month journey, the short-term cash flow will naturally differ from this lifecycle-based calculation.

Sensitivity analysis: A sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the financial viability of the business model under various conditions, as shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4. Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios (Cvr & Margin Impact)

Scenario	Key Driver Variable	Projected Financial Impact	Strategic Viability & Insight
Conservative Scenario	1.5% CVR & 20% Churn Spike (~14 organic clients/mo)	~280,000 UAH Net Profit	Highly Viable. Profitability is safely maintained due to strong cross-subsidization from Tier 1 EdTech products.
Base-Case Scenario	3.2% CVR (~29 organic clients/mo)	322,227 UAH Net Profit	Baseline Target. Represents conservative steady-state expectations exclusively driven by B2C.
Upside Scenario	6.0% CVR + Activation of B2B Retainers	> 420,000 UAH Net Profit	Upside Potential. Fixed costs stay the same while B2C revenue grows and B2B generates additional margin.
CAC Shock	+20% Increase in Paid CAC	Paid LTV/CAC ratio drops from 2.4 to 2.0	It's still profitable. Profits are decreasing, but the paid customer acquisition cycle remains mathematically viable.

LTV Shock	-20% Reduction in Net LTV	Paid LTV/CAC ratio drops to 1.9	This scenario is vulnerable. It indicates a high sensitivity to therapist retention and client missed sessions. It requires strict quality control.

The economic structure of the ecosystem demonstrates a dynamic of operating leverage, in which fixed costs remain relatively stable, while revenue grows in proportion to user acquisition through two channels. This dynamic is typical of scalable digital platform models and confirms the validity of the strategic transition from a linear, service-based model to a multi-tiered ecosystem.

Chapter 6. Implementation Plan and Risk Management

An implementation strategy is required to provide a logical pathway from the steady-state economic model established in Chapter 5 to a realistic business development strategy. The previously developed digital learning platform model provided a rationale that the digital learning platform could generate profits in the long-term under certain conditions, but achieving such profitability depends upon careful planning for staged investment in capital and carefully timed service layer expansions. Therefore, the objective of this Chapter is to operationalize the previous Chapter's model through the use of a defined 24-month strategic roadmap and objectives that have measurable outcomes, along with a risk management program that addresses the risks associated with brand development and digital business development.

The implementation will take place in phases. The plan is to begin with a low-cost initial phase. The positive cash flow generated by the first-tier digital products will then be used to expand into more complex service levels, following the financial logic described in Section 5.

6.1. STRATEGIC ROADMAP

The transition from an individual's private practice to a comprehensive EdTech ecosystem will take place in three phases: Phase I—building the foundation and validating the concept; Phase II—consolidation and achieving stable consistency; Phase III—controlled growth with partial technological autonomy. Across the entire action plan, the central idea will be controlled scaling. The goal is to build trust, ensure high-quality service delivery, and scale up only after critical unit economic efficiency metrics have been validated in practice. A graphical representation of this phased implementation approach is shown in Figure 6.1.



Fig. 6.1. Visual Representation of the 24-Month Implementation Roadmap; Elaborated by author, 2026.

6.1.1. STAGE 1: BUILDING THE FOUNDATION, BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND INITIAL CONCEPT VALIDATION (MONTH 1- MONTH 6)

Stage 1 (Months 1–6) will include the creation of a premium-class basic infrastructure for a trust-sensitive mental health ecosystem that requires strict privacy protection, using non-digital communication channels to interact with clients without using any additional technologies beyond those necessary to ensure the infrastructure's operation. The primary goals of this stage will be to offer the Tier 1 Core Product Line, validate paid acquisition models within a controlled testing environment, and present a preliminary version of the curated marketplace in a controlled testing environment.

There is no requirement during this stage for a fully proprietary software solution. An alternative would be to utilize professional digital interfaces that facilitate low-friction conversions and meet all applicable laws with regards to confidentiality, etc., while relying on third-party providers for hosting, scheduling/booking, and automation services. Using third-party tools minimizes technical risks and allows management to make changes to conversion algorithms immediately after the product is released. The expected setup expense will range between $4,000 – $7,000. The amount represents an approximate budget for the initial implementation versus being a large-scale venture-capital funded project. The budget will consist of both early capital expenditures (CAPEX) for equipment purchases and/or leasing and an operating reserve (OPEX) for early marketing expenses, as described in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1. Phase 1 Setup Investment Budget

Investment Category	Operational Description	Estimated Budget (USD)
Front-End & Ecosystem Setup (CAPEX)	Development of a professional website, payment integration, booking tools, intake logic, and LMS routing.	$2,000 - $3,000
Content Production & Identity (CAPEX)	Creation of initial EdTech materials, course packaging, and consistent brand design assets.	$1,500 - $2,000
Legal Setup & Compliance (CAPEX)	Contracts with psychologists, privacy documentation, public offers, and internal service protocols.	$500 - $1,000
Initial Operating Runway (OPEX Buffer)	Covering early-stage marketing cycles and software subscriptions prior to stable cash inflow.	$500 - $1,000
Total Front-Loaded Budget		$4,000 - $7,000

Operationally, Phase 1 contains three core execution steps. The first is the initial Tier 1 EdTech launch to generate early cash inflow and test if the CAC remains within the modeled range. The second is launching the marketplace cohort, limited to 3 to 5 psychologists. This volume was chosen on purpose. It allows control of quality and product verification without overloading the founder with work. The third is the release of physical products that increase brand recognition, such as therapeutic guides. As shown in Section 5.1.2, these products serve mostly to increase brand awareness rather than as a primary source of revenue.

Table 6.2. Phase 1 Governance Checkpoint

Governance Element	Plan / Metric
Phase	1: Foundation, Infrastructure, and Initial Validation
Decision / Action	Launch Tier 1 EdTech, deploy 3rd-party digital front-end, initiate marketplace MVP (3-5 psychologists).
Owner	Founder & Ecosystem Operations Manager
KPI	EdTech launch executed; Paid CAC remains < $10; 3-5 psychologists actively matched.
Go / No-Go Criteria	Tier 1 products must generate positive net cash flow to successfully fund Tier 2 scaling without requiring external capital.
Main Risk	Founder burnout from content creation; technical integration delays between third-party tools.
Mitigation	Enforce strict 15-hour/week clinical limit; use proven third-party SaaS (e.g., Kwiga) instead of writing custom code.

6.1.2. PHASE 2: OPERATIONAL STABILITY, RECURRING REVENUE GROWTH AND CONTROLLED CAPACITY EXPANSION (MONTHS 7 – 12)

All components of the overall system are expected to be implemented by the 7th month. The goal of Phase 2 is to stabilize the systems that generate steady revenue and to scale capacity in a controlled and systematic approach. The main task at this stage is to create a Subscription Club. This club generates MRR for the company, retains customers after they have purchased lower-priced products, and reduces “churn” because customers continue to buy additional products through the same platform they used to purchase items before.

Another key initiative at this stage is the company’s entry into the structured B2B market. There are many corporations that may require psychological services, but the goal of this stage is not to attract every single one of them, but to conduct an experimental phase to test effectiveness. After signing two contracts in the B2B segment, the company will be able to test the effectiveness of its services, optimize them based on recommendations from compliance specialists (psychologists), and leverage the founder's academic affiliation as a key indicator of trust.

This stage also ensures the transition of the marketplace's operational level to a state of operational stability. At this stage, it is important to take into account a key difference. The financial model projects 552 sessions per month as the theoretical maximum in a steady state, assuming 100% capacity utilization. At the same time, the company is targeting 350 to 450 sessions with a stable team of 8–10 psychologists as a reasonable growth target for the first year. This is a more conservative estimate of the potential volume of sessions generated in the first year, taking into account real challenges related to psychologists' adaptation time, client churn rates, and schedule variability. At this stage of the process, the workload on management will begin to reach operational limits. Therefore, when the operational team reaches 12–15 active psychologists, a head of the therapy department will be added to the team to prevent the founder from returning to full-time management functions.

Table 6.3. Phase 2 Governance Checkpoint

Governance Element	Plan / Metric
Phase	2: Consolidation, Recurring Revenue, and Operational Stabilization
Decision / Action	Launch Subscription Club (MRR), begin working with potential clients in the B2B segment, scale marketplace to 8-10 psychologists.
Owner	Ecosystem Operations Manager & Head of Therapy
KPI	~65 active Subscription Club members; ≥2 B2B contracts secured; 350-450 total monthly sessions achieved.
Go / No-Go Criteria	Effective platform margin must remain ≥20%; overall refund/complaint rate stays below 5%.
Main Risk	A decrease in quality and a loss of market share when the team expands.

Mitigation	Hire Head of Therapy to conduct supervision (at 12+ psychologists); enforce strict UIPP curation and SLA replacement policies.

6.1.3. PHASE 3: ESTABLISHING SELECTIVE TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE & SCALABLE GROWTH (MONTHS 13 – 24)

Phase 3 of this roadmap lays the foundation for creating a healthcare technology platform in which investors can confidently invest, based on the company's preparation during Phase 3. By analyzing internal metrics, we will identify which specific elements of digital processes are creating operational bottlenecks. The development of proprietary technologies should be focused primarily on eliminating the identified bottlenecks. For example, if there are ongoing issues with data mapping, reporting, or customer routing, a specialized workflow dashboard or CRM automation may be required. Regarding external financing in Phase 3, while such options can be considered, they should be viewed as a strategic choice rather than a guaranteed outcome. The goal is to build a company that can attract funding through detailed financial reports ready for investors and documentation of the company’s progress. Marketing diversification efforts should remain focused, and the company should continue to evaluate search traffic and partnership opportunities to reduce dependence on any single customer acquisition channel.

Table 6.4. Phase 3 Governance Checkpoint

Governance Element	Plan / Metric
Phase	3: Selective Technological Independence and Scalable Expansion
Decision / Action	Selectively implement technologies to eliminate bottlenecks (CRM/matching logic), diversify acquisition channels, prepare investor data room.
Owner	Founder & Financial/Tech Contractors

KPI	Proprietary tech deployed (if justified); CAC breakdown has been prepared for various channels; investor data room completed.
Go / No-Go Criteria	Proprietary tech development is only approved if 3rd-party SaaS solutions or the limitations associated with them are slowing down business growth.
Main Risk	Execution overreach (wasting capital on unneeded technology); loss of strategic focus.
Mitigation	All technology-related expenses should be linked exclusively to identified bottlenecks; external financing should be viewed as a strategic option rather than a necessity for survival.

6.1.4. PHASED FUNDING STRATEGY, TOTAL CAPITAL NEEDED AND SEQUENTIAL PAYBACK ANALYSIS

The total capital required by the end of the first year includes both initial startup costs (approximately \$4,000–\$7,000) and controlled management of ongoing monthly expenses. Thus, this approach allows for minimizing “sunk” costs. Also it maintains flexibility to adapt to changing business needs. So, return on investment should not be interpreted as a single ratio comparing initial capital investment with potential future profitability. Instead, a more accurate approach would be to assess sequential return on investment. Specifically, the primary financial assessment will focus on whether the surplus at the beginning of the month can reasonably cover all launch costs and support further expansion without significant additional funding from outside investors.

6.2. MEASURING SUCCESS (OKRS)

A small number of Objectives and key Results should be established to monitor how effectively the activities implemented during phase 1 align with the economic model outlined in Chapter 5. While growth is important to measure, it is equally critical to assess operational discipline, quality maintenance and the emergence of sustainable monthly recurring revenue streams.

Table 6.5. Performance Measurement Framework (Year 1 OKRs)

Strategic Objective	Key Results (Metrics & Deliverables)	Target Time Frame
Objective 1: Validate the core unit economics of the ecosystem.	• KR 1.1: Execute 4 structured EdTech launches, maintaining the blended CAC within the modeled tolerance. • KR 1.2: Acquire ≥ 300 paid users per launch across Tier 1 products, while keeping profit margins. • KR 1.3: Build a stable marketplace team of 8-10 active psychologists. • KR 1.4: Achieve a monthly marketplace volume of 350-450 sessions (500+ as an ambitious target). • KR 1.5: Maintain a refund and complaint rate below 5% across all products.	By Month 12
Objective 2: Build recurring revenue and institutional credibility.	• KR 2.1: Launch the Subscription Club and stabilize it at ~65 active participants. • KR 2.2: Secure ≥ 2 active B2B corporate retainers, generating baseline B2B revenue. • KR 2.3: Create a documented evidence base for future B2B expansion (service structure, pricing feedback, objections).	By Month 12
Objective 3: Prepare the ecosystem for selective Year 2 scaling.	• KR 3.1: Build standardized internal reporting (CAC, churn, retention, therapist utilization, cohort performance). • KR 3.2: Identify which digital functions justify internal tech development vs. outsourcing. • KR 3.3: Prepare an investor-grade financial package and data room for potential external capital.	Months 10-12

Source: Own elaboration based on the phased scaling strategy and economic modeling.

These measurements can be tracked using a systematic OKR format for the first year of implementation (Table 6.5). Again, to avoid measuring success relative to factors outside of control (such as receiving additional funding), the Objectives were carefully selected to reflect only those areas within management's control.

6.3. RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE

Transitioning from a solo practitioner-based model to a scalable technology-enabled platform presents a lot of new types of risk compared to managing a solo practice. Some of the new risks include market-related, operational-related, regulatory-related, technical-related and reputation-related risks. Therefore, having a formalized framework for mitigating these types of risks is crucial. To establish a high-level view of these risks, and the corresponding risk mitigation strategies, a strategic risk assessment matrix is provided in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6. Strategic Risk Assessment and Mitigation Matrix

Risk Category & Source	Vulnerability & Business Impact	Strategic Mitigation Framework
1. Operational & Brand (Content Burnout)	Decline in organic content quality or founder exhaustion reduces top-of-funnel demand, destroying the zero-CAC acquisition model.	Capacity Reinvestment Cycle: limit clinical load at 15 hrs/week. Strictly reallocate the founder's energy to content production and brand trust maintenance.
2. Legal & Regulatory (Tax Limits & Data)	Exceeding the 10.1 M UAH FOP limit; B2B contracting constraints; potential mental health data privacy violations.	Phased Legal Restructuring: Utilize agency agreements (договір доручення) for early tax efficiency. Plan Phase 3 transition to LLC (TOB) and ensure GDPR compliance.
3. Financial / Market (Platform Leakage)	Clients and psychologists bypass the platform to avoid the 30% commission, significantly reducing customer LTV.	Professional Dependency: Enforce NDAs. Provide unmatched value via high-level clinical supervision by the founder, making independent practice irrational for juniors.
4. Technological (Execution Overreach)	Delays, payment routing issues, and cost overruns associated with building unseasonable proprietary software.	Rely on validated third-party SaaS (Kwiga) initially. Internalize tech development only based on proven operational bottlenecks in Phase 3.
5. Reputational (Quality Concentration)	A professional mistake by a marketplace psychologist damages the founder's entire centralized public brand.	Hire specialists exclusively through UIPP partnership. Implement strict protocols, a free replacement session SLA, and hire a Head of Therapy.

Source: Own elaboration based on internal risk modeling and compliance requirements.

6.3.1. DECLINE OF THE ORGANIC AUDIENCE ASSET AND FOUNDER CONTENT EXHAUSTION

One of the largest strategic risks for a founder-led company in the digital space is the decline of the organic customer asset because of founder burnout or declining quality of content. Because the system has a heavy reliance upon "warm" inbound demand, this represents a significant area of concern.

The answer to this problem is contained in the strategy model already created: limiting the founder's clinical load to 15 hours per week will allow him to allocate his time to generate demand, develop products, and build trust with the community. But this only works if all of the non-core functions have been delegated by the founder. If this is not done, she will continue to spend her energy on tactical crisis management rather than on improving economic performance.

6.3.2. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH LEGAL/TAX REGULATIONS/RISK MANAGEMENT

Legal risks in the ecosystem occur in two areas. The first is risks related to taxation and organizational and structural issues. As revenue grows, the simplified FOP regime may become ineffective or restrictive, especially in terms of revenue limits and contract logic in the B2B segment. The second type of risk is related to compliance with regulatory requirements for mental health data, psychologist qualifications, and the legal structure of the marketplace model.

The risk mitigation strategy should be implemented in phases. In the short term, contracts, public offerings, privacy policies, and service flows must be carefully aligned with the existing FOP structure and with the assumptions about the agency model used in Section 5. In the medium term, the business should prepare for restructuring into an LLC if revenue growth, the signing of corporate contracts, or investor interest make the current structure inefficient or non-compliant.

It is also important that the favorable tax regime modeled in Section 5.4 depends on appropriate legal implementation and the separation of market flows. This is not just a technical accounting detail, but a central assumption of the platform's financial logic.

6.3.3. RISK OF DISINTERMEDIATION (BYPASSING THE PLATFORM)

The biggest concern for service marketplaces is competition from customers and service providers who bypass the platform to avoid the commission fees. This is a greater concern in a mental health context due to the nature of the relationship formed as a result of multiple sessions creating long-term double-sided relationships.

Agreements and non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are not enough to prevent losses related to disintermediation. Instead, the platform must provide real value to both clients and service providers through tools such as: providing a steady stream of potential clients; managing payments; and simplifying the process of scheduling meetings. Another method of mitigating disintermediation risk uses the founder's professional reputation. As an official UIPP trainer/practitioner and provider of multidisciplinary certification, the founder offers clinical supervision services that are highly attractive to new psychologists who want to expand their skills. This attractiveness leads to a certain form of dependency, resulting in supervisory oversight used as a structural tool for retention in the ecosystem and as a quality control mechanism.

6.3.4. TECHNOLOGICAL EXECUTION RISK

Risks related to technology implementation (i.e., delays, cost overruns, and failed technology integration) are expected to increase with continued digitalization. By adopting a phased approach to digitalization, the company can minimize the risks associated with technology implementation by using proven third-party tools until it begins its own development in Phase 3, which will allow it to eliminate identified operational bottlenecks and, thus, reduce the risk of over-expansion while keeping technology investments aligned with actual needs.

6.3.5. QUALITY CONTROL AND REPUTATIONAL CONCENTRATION RISK

Even a single negative client experience with one psychologist can negatively impact the entire ecosystem, because the reputation risks are concentrated around the founder's brand. To minimize these types of risks, there must be a formal quality management system in place. Examples include: developing systematic onboarding processes for new therapists; standardizing service delivery protocols; and implementing procedures for transferring clients from one therapist to another in cases of non-compliance. Also, the planned delegation of oversight responsibilities to the Head of the Therapy department will help minimize administratively challenging tasks when the team expands.

6.4. CONCLUSION: IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

The roadmap for implementation illustrates that it will take several steps and some time before a founder-led digital company develops from private practice into a nationally recognized platform. Validation and reinvestment, along with selective expansion, are parts of an evolutionary process.

Chapter 5 theoretically demonstrated that profitability will ultimately prevail in a state of equilibrium, but Chapter 6 shows how realistic it is to expect such equilibrium states to be achieved through scaling up operations without unlimited capital or trouble-free operations. The sequence of actions here is targeted: first, the effectiveness of a highly profitable digital direction must be verified. Then, stable products with regular revenue and teams to implement them must be created. And then, selectively invest in technical independence and scaling, going outside the limits of previous possibilities.

Thus, the implementation roadmap serves not only as an operational plan but also as a mechanism for transforming the founder-led personal brand into a protected, scalable, and institutionally viable business ecosystem.

Chapter 7. Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The objective of this capstone project was to develop a strategic transition plan for RUDNYTSKA.SPACE, transforming it from a highly restricted, founder-based private practice to a scalable, brand driven EdTech ecosystem. To validate the assumption that a personal brand could be expanded using a diversified product ladder, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used; specifically an operational audit, qualitative target audience assessment, empirical market testing and financial modeling. The data supports the concept of expanding a personal brand through a diversified product ladder.

The operational audit (Chapter 2), highlighted a critical structural limitation inherent in the existing "Solo Expert" model. While the Solo Expert model produces a high margin per client, the business is limited by the physical capacity of the founder (approximately 100 sessions/month). This limiting factor presents a significant opportunity cost. Based on limited time slot availability and a high price point (4000 UAH per session), a considerable amount of inquiry (approximately 900/month) cannot be converted to new clients and therefore represents lost demand and limits the founder's ability to generate revenue. Thus, the founder faces a high risk of burnout based upon this self-imposed ceiling.

In response to this bottleneck, a three tiered EdTech ecosystem was designed (Chapter 3). A key aspect of this decision is the strategic use of the founder's personal brand as a mechanism for attracting customers and a tool for building trust and ensuring quality during the initial stages of customer interaction, rather than just as a way to provide services.

Using the proposed product ladder, its viability was empirically tested through real-time market experimentation (Chapter 4). A retrospective analysis of the launch of a Tier 1 EdTech product (127 sales driven by organic traffic) showed that lower-priced asynchronous courses can serve as an alternative for price-sensitive customers. Otherwise, competitors would capture them, so introducing these courses allows the company to return previously lost demand without putting the premium therapy segment at risk. Additionally, prospective validation of Tier 2 through the Concierge MVP waitlist (41 qualified leads) provided strong empirical support for the Brand Trust Transfer hypothesis. 82% of participants indicated willingness to receive care from hired psychologists if those psychologists had been certified and trained by the founder.

The economic impact of this finding (Chapter 5) is quite notable. Introducing higher margin digital products, a curated B2C marketplace operated on a 30% commission model and B2B corporate retainers enables the company to de-couple the founders' time from generating revenue. Projections of steady state performance indicate a net profit margin for the B2C model of approximately 55.1%. Also, this transformation increases the founder's effective profitability by more than 40% and removes the physical constraints on potential revenue generated by the ecosystem model, compared to traditional service delivery models. Taken together, this indicates that the transition from selling services on an "hour-for-dollar" basis to a mature, branded ecosystem is not only economically sound but also practically essential for achieving sustainable growth. In addition, it demonstrates how clinical expertise can be transformed into scalable products without reducing their quality.

7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGY

Recommendations for strategic implementation are a key component of this section. The transition plan should be viewed as a list of priorities, not merely a series of proposals. Below is a summary of transition guidelines that will help key company stakeholders evaluate the transition planning process and provide an overview of the next steps the company needs to take:

- Confirmed: The primary Tier 1 customer base (127 organic sales) and the B2C trust transfer for Tier 2 customers (82% acceptance rate, 41 leads waiting) have been confirmed through empirical evidence (see Chapter 4).

- Unconfirmed: The B2B corporate sales cycle, long-term client retention (LTV) and ability to use paid advertising to achieve scalable customer acquisition cost (CAC) on cold traffic are unverified and need to be tested in the marketplace.
- First step: The most immediate action that needs to take place is to launch the Tier 1 EdTech product lines using existing third-party platforms. In addition, there is a need to limit the founders' clinical hours to 15 hours per week. This is necessary to prevent burn out while generating the operational cash flow required to grow the team.
- Do Not Scale: It is crucial for the company to avoid investing in the development of its own LMS/CRM platforms at the start, as well as to avoid active efforts to acquire a large number of B2B customers until the regular income from both 1 and 2 tier B2C customers has stabilized (see Chapter 5).

By combining this priority order into the Strategic Recommendations Matrix (Table 7.1), a clear and concise action plan can be provided to stakeholders

Table 7.1. Strategic Recommendations Matrix for Ecosystem Transition

Strategic Recommendation	Core Rationale & Business Impact	Immediate Implementation Action
1. Execute Phased Capital Deployment	Prevents unnecessary irrecoverable expenses at the venture capital stage. Digital products must generate validated operating cash flows to fund subsequent, more complex service layers.	Launch Phase 1 exclusively using cost-effective third-party SaaS (Kwiga); defer proprietary LMS development to Phase 3.
2. Institutionalize "Brand Trust Transfer"	Essential to prevent reputational damage and structural leakage (psychologists disintermediating the platform to operate in the gray market).	Formalize an academic partnership with UIPP for the purpose of hiring staff; actively promote the founder as a clinical supervisor.

3. Strictly Enforce Capacity Limits	The central goal of the ecosystem is burnout mitigation. The founder must not simply replace clinical burnout with managerial overload.	Strictly cap clinical interventions to 15 hours/week (Tier 3 VIPs). Delegate all day-to-day operations to the Ops Manager from Month 1.
4. Proactive Legal & Tax Restructuring	The projected revenue will rapidly reach the 10.1 M UAH limit of the FOP 3rd Group. Tax efficiency (5% on margin) is highly sensitive to incorrect legal drafting.	Immediately implement agency agreements (договір доручення); initiate LLC (TOB) transition planning by the end of Year 1.
5. Prioritize the Subscription Model (MRR)	Maximizes Customer Lifetime Value (LTV) and serves as the connective tissue of the ecosystem, mitigating the churn of psychological services.	Prioritize the launch of the "Subscription Club" to stay in touch with clients between completing asynchronous courses and booking active therapy.

Source: Own elaboration based on financial modeling and risk assessment findings.

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APPENDIX A

Social Media Audience Metrics

Fig. A.1. Combined analytics dashboards from Instagram, Facebook, and Tik-Tok confirming a total audience of over 93000 followers. RUDNYTSKA.SPACE accounts; *Instagram, Facebook, TikTok*, March, 2026.

APPENDIX B

Anonymized Customer Inquiries (Digital Ethnography)

The following figure contains anonymized excerpts from direct messages received by the brand, illustrating the primary psychological and financial barriers identified during the digital ethnography phase.



Fig. B.1. Anonymized user messages demonstrating financial barriers and demand for brand-verified specialists. RUDNYTSKA.SPACE Instagram Direct. *Instagram*, March 2026.

APPENDIX C

Consolidated Financial Summary: "Personal Boundaries" Course Pilot Launch

Table C.1. Financial metrics of the pilot launch (Organic traffic only).

Metric	Value
Total Sales Volume	127 conversions
Via WayForPay Gateway	107 conversions
Via Direct Manual Transfer	20 conversions
Price per Unit (Standard Tier)	890 UAH
Total Gross Revenue	113,030 UAH
Revenue via WayForPay	96,365 UAH
Revenue via Manual Transfers	16,665 UAH
Direct Advertising Spend (Paid CAC)	0 UAH (Organic reach)
Operational Expenses (LMS "Softbook")	7,476 UAH
Net Profit (excluding opportunity cost of time)	105,554 UAH
Financial ROI (Direct Capital Expenditure)	~1411%

Source: Own elaboration based on aggregated transaction records (WayForPay merchant extract and manual transfer logs): https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HECSOP8cgWkLerOt-mZ-JL2HbzAPaaqK/view?usp=sharing

APPENDIX D

Price Sensitivity and Trust Transfer Survey Results (Experiment 2)

The following figure provides visual confirmation of the "Brand Trust Transfer" hypothesis, gathered via an interactive Instagram Stories poll. The results demonstrate the audience's high psychological readiness to accept delegated therapy from a brand-verified team of psychologists.



Fig. D.1. Instagram poll results confirming high audience readiness (82%) to engage with the Tier 2 marketplace rather than insisting exclusively on the founder's personal services (18%); RUDNYTSKA.SPACE Instagram Account; *Instagram*, 15 Feb. 2026.

APPENDIX E

Concierge MVP Waitlist Data Distribution (Experiment 3)

The following figures provide a visual representation of the behavioral, financial, and therapeutic preferences of the 41 qualified leads generated during the Tier 2 Concierge MVP validation phase. The charts detail the audience's budget tolerance, preferred service formats, critical decision drivers, and primary psychological needs.







Fig. E.1. Composite view of Waitlist respondent analytics, including the distribution of budget constraints, chosen interaction formats, primary criteria for specialist selection, and requested therapeutic topics; *Google Forms*, 25 Feb. 2026.

The dataset containing raw survey responses from the Waitlist validation experiment (41 entries) has been deposited in a secure digital archive.The full anonymized dataset can be accessed via the following link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/12rcKxiiwRNWjbWDb9s5xko-_-rsKoKDr/view?usp=sharing