Academic seminar "Wage bargaining in a matching market: experimental evidence" by Oleg Korenok

10/22/2020 at 5:00 PM ISST

KSE is pleased to invite to the academic seminar "Wage bargaining in a matching market: experimental evidence" by Oleg Korenok that will be held on October 22 at 17:00 (Kyiv time). 

About the speaker. Oleg Korenok a Professor in the Department of Economics at Virginia Commonwealth University. He uses experiments and time series analysis to test economic theories about money and banking, charitable giving, and prices and inflation. He teaches macroeconomics, money and banking, and monetary theory at undergraduate level and time series at graduate level. Oleg got a PhD degree at Rutgers University. 

Abstract. Wage negotiation plays a central role in the dynamics of search and matching models. We explore the theoretical wage predictions of the canonical search and matching model of Diamond (1982) in laboratory bargaining experiments. Overall, wages in the experiment are less responsive to changes in the market conditions than theory predicts. Wages respond to changes in unemployment insurance in the correct direction, yet the size of the response is about half of what theory predicts. On the other hand, contrary to theory, wages are unresponsive to changes in the level of unemployment. We also find that wages of new matches are more sensitive than wages of on-going matches, and that the duration of unemployment influences wages in certain settings.

This seminar is enabled by the financial support from Sweden. 

Registration for this event is closed.


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