Disclaimer: At the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine KSE Institute launched an analytical project, which was named \u201cSelfSanctions\u201d, aimed to collect data on foreign companies operating in the Russian market and limiting or terminating their activities. Examination of data was conducted jointly with specialists from the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. The database contains a lot of information, we collect daily statistics on changes in the status of foreign companies operating\/operated in the Russian market and limiting or terminating their activities. Also, we created the Telegram bot https:\/\/t.me\/exit_ru_bot<\/a> for tracking\/monitoring of news on priority foreign companies (coverage 1, 2, 3 or 7 days of monitoring). Also, we do regular analysis of changes in share prices and capitalization of parent groups of companies that have or have had business in Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n KSE database is partly based on the Yale\u2019s School of Management database<\/a>, the University of St.Gallen latest Paper<\/a>, epravda.com.ua<\/a>, squeezingputin.com<\/a>, https:\/\/bloody.energy\/<\/a> and leave-russia.org<\/a> websites and other open sources. Data is verified and KSE status is assigned. Data on stocks is taken from Google and Yahoo Finance. At the same time, the KSE database is more complete and comprehensive and contains much more information than most other similar databases, as it also includes data on number of staff, revenue, capital and other financial indicators, the latest updates and changes in statuses, links to used sources, and daily updates from the telegram-bot etc.<\/p>\n KSE Institute and Leave Russia project are the part of <\/i>B4Ukraine Coalition<\/i><\/a> since mid-2022.<\/i><\/p>\n KSE Institute is glad to announce have finalized merging <\/a>with project leave-russia.org<\/a> which was developed by a team of volunteers.<\/p>\n Also, we developed an application in the\u00a0 Apple Store<\/b><\/a> which is available only for mobile devices in addition to our Telegram bot https:\/\/t.me\/exit_ru_bot<\/a>. It allows you to find any brand or company that is operating in Russia just by scanning barcodes.<\/i><\/p>\n On February 24, 2024 KSE Institute merged KSE status \u201cwait\u201d with status \u201cstay\u201d as 2 years of the war gave enough time for companies to leave Russia<\/b><\/i>KSE DATABASE SNAPSHOT as of 03.04.2025<\/b><\/p>\n Number of the companies that continue Russian operations<\/b> (KSE\u2019s status \u00abstay<\/b>\u00bb\u00b9<\/b>) \u2013 2 270\u00b2 (+7 per month<\/b>)<\/b><\/p>\n Number of the companies that have curtailed Russian operations<\/b> (KSE\u2019s status \u00ableave<\/b>\u00bb<\/b>) \u2013 1 358 (+1 per month)<\/b><\/p>\n Number of the companies that completed withdrawal from Russia<\/b> (KSE\u2019s status \u201cexited<\/b>\u201d) \u2013 487 (+6 per month)<\/b><\/p>\n As of April 3, 2025,<\/b> we have identified about 4,115 companies, organizations and their brands from 108 countries and 58 industries<\/b> and analyzed their position on the Russian market. About 40% of them are public ones, for ~1\u2019627 public groups of companies<\/b>, we also identified (where it was possible) their operating business in Russia (the presence of a controlling stake in a legal entity and revenue received) and found the data for 2021 before invasion was started, which allowed us to calculate the value of capital invested in the country (about $195.1 billion<\/b>), local revenue (about $320.0 billion<\/b>), local assets (about $350.7 billion<\/b>) as well as staff (about 1.454 million people<\/b>) and taxes paid (about $25.7 billion<\/b>). 1,358 foreign companies<\/b> have suspended or ceased operations in Russia. Also, we added information about 487<\/b> companies that have completed the sale\/liquidation of their business in Russia<\/a> based on the information collected from the official registers (2 business sales, and 4 business liquidations took place in March 2025).<\/p>\n As can be seen from the tables below, as of April 3, 2025, 487 <\/b>companies which had already completely exited from the Russian Federation, in 2021 had at least 579,600 personnel<\/b>, $106.4 bn in annual revenue<\/b>, $55.6bn in capital <\/b>and $89.1bn in assets<\/b>; companies, that declared a complete withdrawal from Russia had 220,900 personnel<\/b>, $44.0bn in revenues<\/b>, $20.1bn in capital <\/b>and $46.5bn in assets<\/b>; companies that suspended operations on the Russian market had 107,900 personnel<\/b>, annual revenue of $31.9bn<\/b>, $35.8bn in capital <\/b>and $88.4bn in assets<\/b>.<\/p>\n If since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the percentage of companies that closed operations in Russia has risen sharply by mid-April 2022, in the last 31 months the ratio of those who leave or stay is virtually unchanged, although we still see a periodic increase in the share of those companies that remain in the Russian market (by adding new companies to the database, 14 were added in March 2025). However, if to operate with the total numbers<\/b> in KSE database, about 33.0% of foreign companies have already announced their withdrawal from the Russian market or suspended their activity, but another 55.2% are still remaining in the country and only 11.8% made a complete exit\u00b3<\/p>\n At the same time, it is difficult not to overestimate the impact on the Russian economy of 487 companies that completely left the country, since in 2021 they employed 39.9% of the personnel employed in foreign companies, the companies owned about 25.4% of the assets, had 28.5% of capital invested by foreign companies, and in 2021 they generated revenue of $106.4 billion or 33.3% of total revenue and paid ~$6.1 billion of taxes or 23.7% of total taxes paid by the companies observed. Data on 1,627 TOP companies is presented in the table above.<\/p>\n As it is visible on the charts based on data for 2021 above, % of exited <\/b>is obtained based on number of companies (30%) and on share of revenue withdrawn (33.3%). At the same time, a bit different picture is for those who are still staying <\/b>– 46% of companies represent 43.0% of revenue received in Russia. The conclusion could be that smaller companies with lower revenue prefer to stay and those who have higher revenue are more eager to wait, limiting their investments as an excuse (at the same time they continue to earn and reinvest their local profit). Also, migration of statuses in June 2024 made its effect as well as adding quite a lot of new companies in July 2024 and each month.<\/p>\n KSE Institute has also collected and analyzed data on revenue, capital, assets and net income (profit or loss) in 2022<\/b> for ~1574 companies (about 50 companies the data of which we have collected previously have not provided their reporting, we also added revenue data for about 30 banks) and provides below the detailed analysis.<\/p>\n As you can see from the charts above, companies which fully exited<\/b> Russia were able to generate 3.8% less of revenue in 2022 (29.5% from total volume) than in 2021 (33.3% from total volume, which is clear as most of them left the country before the year-end). Leaving companies<\/b> also generated much less (-8.5%) revenue in 2022 (15.2% from total volume) than in 2021 (23.7% from total volume). At the same time, staying <\/b>companies were able to generate much (+12.3%) more revenue in 2022 (55.3% from total volume) than in 2021 (43.0% from total volume). So the key conclusion is that money matters for those companies who are still tied with its local business in Russia and they were even able to gain more.<\/p>\n Summarizing the results of data received for 2022 and comparing it with 2021 we can see the positive trends in terms of significant revenue and capital decline. Only assets have almost not changed ($351.7bn\u2074 in 2022 vs $350.7bn in 2021) and would even probably increase if the remaining reporting for ~70-80 companies could be obtained (until companies decide not to disclose it). KSE Institute in September 2024 has published a study entitled \u201cWhat are the financial results of foreign business in Russia in 2023, and have exit rates slowed down?<\/i><\/b><\/a>\u201d where, among other things, we estimated that over the two years since the full-scale invasion, Russia has lost USD 125 billion in revenue from Western companies, equivalent to about 5.6% of the country\u2019s GDP. You can download its full text in English here: https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4961551<\/a>.<\/p>\n On January 13, 2025 the new research<\/b> was published by the B4Ukraine<\/a> coalition in collaboration with the Kyiv School of Economics and Squeezing Putin<\/a> which reveals how foreign businesses, including many household names, continue to channel billions in taxes to the Russian state nearly three years into its war on Ukraine. The report named \u201c<\/i>Corporate Enablers of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine: A Closer Look at Multinational Taxes and Revenue in Russia in 2023<\/i><\/b>\u201d<\/i><\/a> calls on companies to make a swift responsible exit from the Russian market and urges the G7 and allied countries to establish standards for corporate behavior, promoting immediate exits from the Russian market.<\/p>\n Also, at the end of February 2025, the KSE Institute published the study \u201c<\/b>Assessing foreign companies\u2019 direct losses in Russia: financial impact, market consequences, and strategic adjustments<\/i><\/b><\/a>\u201d<\/b> where, among other things, we estimated that Foreign businesses\u2019 direct losses in Russia exceed $170 billion due to write-offs, seizures, unfair court rulings, and exit taxes. You can download its full text in English here: https:\/\/kse-ua-prod-media.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/08123114\/kse_assessing-foreign-companies-losses-in-russia.pdf<\/a> \u00a0<\/p>\n Analysis of data for 2023<\/b><\/p>\n KSE Institute has already collected and preliminarily analyzed data on revenue, capital, assets and net income (profit or loss) in 2023<\/b> for ~1469 companies (after it was allowed legally in 2023 about 200 companies the data of which we have collected previously have not provided their reporting and also about 290 companies reported 0 values in revenues). Also, it should be noted that as we convert RUB to USD – the devaluation effect was quite significant<\/b>, Ruble depreciated in 2023 by more than 24%, from 68.4869 RUB\/USD in 2022 to 85.163 RUB\/USD in 2023). Please see below charts with the detailed analysis:<\/p>\n As you can see, there is a significant redistribution in revenue allocation based on KSE statuses happened in 2023: share of \u201cexited\u201d has dropped by -8.7% vs 2021 and -4.9% vs 2022 (from 33.3% in 2021 and from 29.5% in 2022 to 24.6% in 2023) which is explained by the fact that more and more companies are being liquidated and those one which were sold are usually not able to generate the previous level of revenue<\/b>.<\/p>\n Share of companies with status \u201cleave\u201d has dropped even more, by -15.9% vs 2021 and -7.4% vs 2022 (from 23.7% in 2021 and from 15.2% in 2022 to 7.8% in 2023) which is explained by the fact that those companies which are leaving are not concentrated in revenue generation on the Russian market anymore<\/b>.<\/p>\n As for companies with status \u201cstay\u201d – we see the opposite picture there, they are using momentum to take market share of those who are leaving or left (especially in automotive sector) and are generating comparable with previous years level of revenue<\/b>: +24.7% vs 2021 and +12.4% vs 2022 (from 43.0% in 2021 and from 55.3% in 2022 to 67.7% in 2023).<\/p>\n MONTHLY FOCUS: On leaving the Russian Federation. Results of March 2025<\/b><\/p>\n In this digest, we will summarize the results of March 2025 and provide year-to-date statistics on full exits since the beginning of the war.<\/p>\n In our project, we pay special attention to companies that have their own legal entities in Russia, pay taxes, hire staff, etc.\u00a0<\/p>\n We would like to remind you that we assign the status of \u201cexited\u201d exclusively based on the results of changes in the composition of company owners in the Russian Federation reflected in the official register, or when the closing of the transaction was notified in another official way (for example, in press releases or during the disclosure of information on the Stock Exchange by public companies) or based on company\u2019s liquidation.There are about 1\u2019627 companies identified in the KSE database with revenue data available of about $320 billion in 2021 and $245.9 billion in 2022 (which dropped to ~$198.1 billion in 2023)<\/b>. And at least 487<\/b> of them have already been sold by local companies or were liquidated and left the Russian market. In March 2025 KSE Institute identified +6 new exits (2 business sales, and 4 liquidations took place in March 2025)<\/b>, total number<\/b> of exits observed since the beginning of Russia’s invasion reached 487<\/b>. Also, 7 more liquidations of companies which were marked as exited before happened in March 2025, namely: <\/b>CNH Industrial<\/b><\/a>, <\/b>Continental<\/b><\/a>, <\/b>Inchcape<\/b><\/a>, <\/b>Kingspan<\/b><\/a>, <\/b>Lufthansa Technik<\/b><\/a>, <\/b>Scania<\/b><\/a> and <\/b>UPS<\/b><\/a>.<\/b><\/p>\n On the chart below, share of exited and other statuses based on revenue-2021 allocation<\/b> is shown. It is worth mentioning when we analyze status \u201cleave\u201d it is also worth paying attention to sub-statuses (suspension could be treated as a temporary pause in operations while withdrawal – is a clear sign of the company’s intention to exit Russia in full).<\/p>\n % of exited is 33% <\/b>based on revenue allocation, those who are leaving<\/b> represent 24%<\/b> of total revenue (with 42%<\/i> share of<\/i> suspensions<\/i> and 58% of withdrawals<\/i> sub-statuses), % of staying <\/b>companies represent 43%<\/b> of revenue based on revenue generated in Russia in 2021. So we observe the situation that % of staying companies is less than % of leaving ones (which means that about 57% (!) of pre-invasion revenue generated by foreigners is leaving or already left Russia).<\/p>\n If we take a look at the same chart based on revenue-2022 distribution<\/b> – the picture will be a bit different:<\/p>\n % of exited is 29% <\/b>based on revenue allocation, those who are leaving<\/b> represent only 16%<\/b> of total revenue (with 38%<\/i> share of<\/i> suspensions<\/i> and 62% of withdrawals<\/i> sub-statuses), % of staying <\/b>companies represent 55%<\/b> of revenue based on revenue generated in Russia in 2022.<\/p>\n Key conclusion could be the following: on the general background of falling revenue in 2022-2023 companies which made the decision to leave earned less than those who stayed and more companies migrated from the \u201csuspension\u201d sub-status to \u201cwithdrawal\u201d showing their increased intention to cut ties with Russia.<\/p>\n Geography is the most important factor that explains companies’ decisions. Companies from “unfriendly countries” (a term coined by the Russian Federation to describe countries that joined the international sanctions policy against the Russian Federation in response to its invasion of Ukraine) are much more likely to exit.<\/p>\n Here are also the breakdowns by countries and by industries of the companies which already exited:<\/p>\n So, as of the end of March 2025, companies from 39 countries<\/b> and 45 industries<\/b> have already exited showing their true reaction to the war started by Russia and its not provoked aggression against Ukraine. Most of the companies were headquartered in the USA, Germany, Finland, Great Britain, France and Sweden and operated in the \u201cAutomotive\u201d, \u201cElectronics\u201d, \u201cConsumer goods and closing\u201d, \u201cFinance and payments\u201d, \u201cConstruction & Architecture\u201d, \u201cEnergy, oil and gas\u201d, \u201cIndustrial equipment\u201d and \u201cIT\u201d industries.<\/p>\n For a more accurate explanation of the behavior of companies, it is necessary to take into account several factors at the same time. According to our analysis, companies in the technological and communication sector are most prone to exit (as opposed to those who remain in the Russian Federation). Partially due to the fact that they have fewer physical assets in the Russian Federation than in the production sectors. Companies that produce products for the daily consumption of the population in the Russian Federation are less likely to leave (this is one of their key explanations why they do not leave). Pharmaceutical companies that explain their decisions by concern for public health tend to be the \u201cstaying\u201d companies.<\/p>\n Companies with larger local revenue and public companies are also inclined to leave the market: presumably, large multinational corporations are more responsible for their reputation and respond to investors’ requests. In addition, it is likely that the exit of the largest multinationals from the Russian Federation is not as painful for them for global business as it is for smaller companies, for which the share of the Russian market can be significant.<\/p>\n Here is the list of \u201cexiters\u201d that we were able to identify recently: Biesterfeld<\/b><\/a> (liquidated), GKN<\/b><\/a> (liquidated), Nordson<\/b><\/a> (liquidated) and Roland Berger<\/b><\/a> (liquidated). Also, 2 business sales were accounted for in March 2025<\/b>: Aliaxis Deutschland<\/b><\/a> (missed earlier) and Sierentz Global Merchants<\/b><\/a> (Steppe Agroholding acquired full control of RZ Agro, which it previously shared with members of the French family of global grain trader Louis Dreyfus). Additionally, 7 more liquidations of companies which were marked as exited before<\/i><\/b> happened in March 2025, namely: CNH Industrial<\/b><\/a>, Continental<\/b><\/a>, Inchcape<\/b><\/a>, Kingspan<\/b><\/a>, Lufthansa Technik<\/b><\/a>, Scania<\/b><\/a> and UPS<\/b><\/a>. Also, in the beginning of April it was announced that Goldman Sachs<\/b><\/a> would sell Russian shares to Balchug Capital.<\/p>\n To read more details on 32 identified cases of full and partial business seizures in Russia – please read our new study named \u201c<\/b>Assessing foreign companies’ direct losses in Russia: financial impact, market consequences, and strategic adjustments<\/i><\/b><\/a>\u201d.<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The next review of deals for April 2025 will be available in a month.<\/p>\n SPECIAL EDITION: Reporting update on the foreign banks in Russia for 12M2024<\/b><\/p>\n KSE Institute collected and pre-processed the available reporting data for 12M2024 of foreign banks in Russia.<\/p>\n For the convenience of users, aggregated data are presented in new dashboard on the site https:\/\/leave-russia.org\/banks<\/a>:<\/p>\n Data on Net profit as of 31.12.2024 and Assets as of 30.09.2024:<\/b><\/p>\n \u0414\u0436\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043b\u043e: <\/i>\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0457<\/i><\/a> ; <\/i>\u041f\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0456\u044f \u0434\u0430\u0448\u0431\u043e\u0440\u0434\u0443<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n![\"RF_03_04_2025_EN2\"](\"https:\/\/kse-ua-prod-media.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/08123208\/rf_03_04_2025_en2.png\")
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