{"id":13203,"date":"2022-09-17T19:04:56","date_gmt":"2022-09-17T16:04:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stage.kse.ua\/news\/financing-ukraine-s-victory\/"},"modified":"2026-09-08T13:34:08","modified_gmt":"2026-09-08T13:34:08","slug":"financing-ukraine-s-victory","status":"publish","type":"news","link":"https:\/\/kse.ua\/en\/news\/financing-ukraine-s-victory\/","title":{"rendered":"Financing Ukraine\u2019s Victory"},"content":{"rendered":"
Jacob Nell, Olena Bilan, Torbjorn Becker, Yuri Gorodnichenko,<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Tymofiy Mylovanov and Nataliia Shapoval<\/strong><\/h5>\n

Download materials<\/a><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/h5>\n

Ukraine has just achieved a stunning success on the battlefield in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, showing that it can win the war. However, we see a growing risk of a major setback on the economic front if donor disbursements continue to be slow and unpredictable and predominantly coming as loans rather than grants.\u00a0 Such a setback \u2013 posing a further risk to macroeconomic stability, weakening the currency and driving inflation higher – could make it difficult for Ukraine to win the war.\u00a0 It would be a completely unnecessary setback, since it can be easily avoided by clearer upfront commitments by donors.<\/p>\n

Here, we do not set out a broad macroeconomic framework for Ukraine during the war \u2013 \u00a0proposals on this topic were set out in the recent CEPR piece<\/a> (CEPR, August 2022, Becker et al).\u00a0 This argued for macroeconomic policies to put Ukraine\u2019s economy on a sustainable trajectory for the duration of the war, including financing the budget without relying on the central bank, moving to a managed float of the currency, tougher regulation of trade and capital flows, and flexibility and efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources.<\/p>\n

Rather, in this paper we focus on the crucial first task of financing the budget, justifying why partner should fund Ukraine\u2019s huge wartime deficit, and proposing how to do so sustainably, \u00a0i.e. without \u00a0recourse to the central bank.\u00a0 In particular, we propose donors provide $50 bn in financing to cover the 2023 budget deficit \u2013 sufficient to finance the budget even in a less favourable scenario without putting domestic stability at risk.\u00a0 In the best case, we would see a large scale IMF programme of perhaps $15 bn as the centrepiece of this financing effort.\u00a0 But at any rate the IMF should agree a programme, monitored by the Board, which will pave the way for other donors to participate, and provide enough financing to cover the $2.7 bn payments due to the IMF itself next year.<\/p>\n

Danger of Deficit Monetization \u00a0and Proposed Solution<\/strong><\/h5>\n

Deficit monetization by the central bank, while being helpful in the first months of the war, puts Ukraine\u2019s incipient and fragile macroeconomic stability at risk.\u00a0 In the first place, monetary financing could lead to a further decline in the currency and surge in inflation.\u00a0 But more generally, a further devaluation, after the 20% devaluation in late July, threatens a more widespread loss of trust in the currency, deeper dollarization and a de-anchoring of inflation expectations \u2013 which can then take an extended period of tight policy to rebuild confidence.\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0Wars typically drive a sharp widening in the deficit, even as financing becomes less available, leading governments to resort to money printing.\u00a0 But this generally leads to high and persistent inflation, especially in emerging markets which lack access to external markets in a crisis, and domestically lack a developed financial system and pool of domestic savings, as in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The danger is insidious. There is no hard and fast link in the very short run between monetary financing \u2013 central bank financing of the budget deficit by buying ministry of finance bonds or making direct loans to or just crediting the account of the ministry of finance \u00a0\u2013 and a weakening of the currency and increase in inflation.\u00a0 This can lull policymakers into thinking that a \u201cmoderate\u201d level of monetary financing is permissible \u2013 and it may seem a relatively small risk to take in a war when the very existence of the country is under threat.\u00a0 In the initial aftermath of the invasion, there was no alternative.\u00a0 But over a somewhat longer period, the relationship between unbacked money creation and accelerating inflation is very strong, and substantial use of monetary financing will almost inevitably \u00a0trigger an ongoing fall in the currency and an acceleration in inflation, which in turn risks de-anchoring inflation expectations, and can pave the way to very high and volatile levels of inflation.\u00a0 This would disrupt Ukraine\u2019s economy and ability to finance the war, prolonging the conflict, \u00a0and could require an extended period of tight policy – high real rates – to re-establish policy credibility,\u00a0 delaying the recovery.In this paper we propose how to provide Ukraine with the financing needed to sustain the military, without putting financial stability at risk.\u00a0 In essence, Ukraine\u2019s allies should step up and deliver on their broad political commitment to support Ukraine.\u00a0 There has been an impressive level of commitments made.\u00a0 However, actual disbursements have not come regularly, particularly from European donors.\u00a0 As a result, the Ukraine government is in a constant precarious state, not knowing which funds will be disbursed every month and often relying on monetary financing to bridge the gap.<\/p>\n

\"Victory2\"<\/figure>\n

We propose Ukraine\u2019s international partners to allocate now a sum sufficient to finance the Ukraine budget for an extended period into a special fund.\u00a0 Disbursements from this fund to the Ukrainian budget would then be made on a regular and predicable schedule, likely monthly, against delivery of agreed data on the financing gap.\u00a0 This would make it possible to finance a budget which supports the Ukrainian military, while avoiding use of monetary financing and \u00a0providing confidence that the deficit can be financed in a non-inflationary manner. \u00a0This approach provides much needed predictability for Ukraine\u2019s public finances.<\/p>\n

Why Donors Should Fund the Deficit<\/strong><\/h5>\n

We see three main reasons why Western governments should fund Ukraine\u2019s deficit:<\/p>\n

1. The first reason is simply that western governments have promised to support Ukraine, and failure to provide enough support in a timely way to avoid a loss of confidence would constitute a failure to deliver on this commitment.\u00a0 Commitment to a significant and sustained (rather than small and piecemeal) support will provide an additional signal that the allies are firmly behind Ukraine and thus accelerate Ukraine\u2019s victory.<\/p>\n

2. The second reason is the consequences of Ukrainian failure.\u00a0 This would demonstrate that a war of aggression like Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine can be successful, and that the original crime of aggression, and subsequent acts, such as Russia\u2019s war crimes, would go unpunished.\u00a0 Successful aggression, and impunity from justice, undermine the rule of law.\u00a0 Practically, success would encourage Russia to launch further acts of aggression, destabilising Europe and undermining peace.<\/p>\n

3. The efficiency comes in two parts.\u00a0 First, Ukraine\u2019s armed forces have been highly effective during the war with Russia, including by \u00a0destroying huge amounts of Russian equipment –\u00a0 with for instance over 1000 Russian tanks\u00a0 and over 6000 items of Russian military equipment visually confirmed as destroyed<\/a> – and inflicting heavy defeats on Russia, including Russia\u2019s April defeat in the battle of Kyiv, and Russia\u2019s September defeat in Ukraine\u2019s Kharkiv counteroffensive. Moreover, these results have been achieved against the Russian army, which is a far more formidable adversary than the Taliban, the Iraqi army or ISIS.<\/p>\n

Second, these impressive results have been achieved at a low cost.\u00a0 This can be seen on several metrics.\u00a0 First, Ukraine is so far a much cheaper war for the allies than Iraq or Afghanistan, even though casualties and the scale of combat is higher.\u00a0 For instance, US spending on Ukraine this year will be less than half US spending in the peak years in Iraq or Afghanistan, which likely reflects that Ukrainian soldiers are paid far less than US or European soldiers. \u00a0Similarly, official aid to Ukraine of all sorts \u2013 financial, military and humanitarian – \u00a0so far is estimated at\u00a0 $85 bn (Ukraine Support Tracker<\/a>), which is 7% of the 2022 defence budgets of NATO members ($1190 billion), and less than 15% of the \u00a0cost of the support European governments have pledged to shield consumers from rising energy prices \u00a0(Brueghel estimates as at end of \u00a0July 2022<\/a> of \u00a0\u20ac270 bn\u00a0 plus August-September packages\u00a0 in the UK, Germany, Italy and\u00a0 France of an equivalent aggregate amount) which are a result of Russia\u2019s squeeze on gas supplies to Europe.<\/p>\n

\"Victory3\"<\/figure>\n
How to Fund the Deficit:\u00a0 Our Proposals <\/strong><\/h5>\n

We now turn to discussing the key parameters of this proposed fund: duration, governance size, conditionality, grant\/loan mix and country contributions.<\/p>\n

Duration<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Up until now, Russia\u2019s economy has performed much better than Ukraine\u2019s.\u00a0 Ukraine\u2019s economy looks set to contact by around 30% this year, with the war having a catastrophic impact in some areas.\u00a0 By contrast, while Russia\u2019s economy will contract, it has to a large extent been shielded from the effect of sanctions by high oil and gas revenues. The initial March-April wave of sanctions did lead to a halving in the value of the RUB and signs of a run on banks, prompting the CBR to hike rates and impose capital controls.\u00a0 But the record current account surplus from surging hydrocarbon revenues and a collapse in imports allowed the CBR to reverse its rate hike and ease capital controls over the summer, as the RUB strengthened back through its pre-war parity.<\/p>\n

However, by the middle of next year, we believe that the economic situation will shift \u00a0strongly in Ukraine\u2019s favour, making strong partner support particularly important over the period until that point.<\/p>\n

In particular, as a result of the European oil embargo and price cap, and the fall in Russian gas sales to Europe to \u00a0a modest amount, \u00a0we expect Russia to see a sharp fall in oil and gas revenues, to a\u00a0 critical level \u2013 around $150n bn USD pa or about $12 bn a month.\u00a0 At this point in the past the Russian government has struggled to finance its budget, as well as its external account, where the surplus on oil and gas has financed deficits on other goods imports, services, and income payments. While the move to a floating currency and the clean-up of the banking system may have strengthened Russia\u2019s resilience, we believe this is offset by the impact of broad sanctions on the Russian financial system.\u00a0 So we expect Russia\u2019s financial fragilities to resurface as oil and gas revenues fall to this critical level, with an enhanced risk of a collapse in the currency and bank runs. In other words, we think that Russia will face financial constraints which will heavily constrain its ability to continue financing its war in the course of 2023.<\/p>\n

\"Victory4\"<\/figure>\n

However, Russia will still has sufficient resources to continue its military offensive into 2023 and we cannot project with confidence when the war will end. Even after the military fighting is over, Ukraine\u2019s economy and budget will not normalize overnight. We view it reasonable for the fund to be established for the duration of next year<\/strong> \u2013 and if we end up in a good scenario where the war finishes before the end of 2023, and the budget financing need it reduced, then the donor funding could be re-directed to finance Ukraine\u2019s reconstruction.<\/p>\n

Governance<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Allocating all resources in a single fund rather than running several funds would be a more efficient option. Currently, financial support is coming to Ukraine via various channels: (i) as direct support from partner countries, with each loan\/grant even for a relatively small amount of $100-200m requiring dedicated diplomatic and bureaucratic work, (ii) from the \u00a0IMF, the World Bank and other IFIs, (iii) via a specially created administered donor account at the IMF and (iv) via a multi-donor trust fund created by the World Bank. This complexity substantially reduces transparency and creates confusion as to the amount of pledged financing. Consolidating all financial support into a single fund will increase transparency and predictability.<\/p>\n

If there is one donor fund, then there should one lead agency.\u00a0 Traditionally, the agency which takes the lead on behalf of the international community on agreeing a financial programme with a country in a crisis situation – providing some support itself and paving the way for wider donor support, which it helps to coordinate \u00a0– is the IMF.\u00a0 It has the technical expertise and credibility, so many finance ministries look to the IMF for a green light before agreeing to disburse donor support.<\/p>\n

However, for much of the conflict the IMF appears to be missing in action.\u00a0 Although the IMF has just now reportedly approved a $1.4 bn package of financial assistance to Ukraine (on top of $1.4bn in emergency financing provided in March), this will only be sufficient to cover Ukraine\u2019s scheduled 2022 repayments to the fund in the amount of $2.4bn.<\/p>\n

The IMF\u2019s passive stance is reportedly for the technical reason that it cannot finance a programme in a country without a sustainable debt position, and it cannot say while the war continues that Ukraine has a sustainable debt position. It likely also reflects differences among the membership, with a Russian representative on the Board and many EMs likely broadly neutral on the conflict and unwilling to agree special treatment for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

However, we think that the US and Ukraine\u2019s allies, who are the most influential members of the Board, may be able to overcome this opposition, perhaps helped by a G7 commitment which can be seen as guaranteeing Ukraine\u2019s debt sustainability.\u00a0 We see a large IMF programme of perhaps $15 bn USD as the centrepiece of the 2023 financing effort as the best outcome for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

If this cannot be agreed, then the IMF should at least agree and monitor a programme, monitored by the Board, which can help support contributions from other donors, and provide enough financing to cover the $2.7 bn payment due next year, so it is at least not contributing to the financing challenge or providing some staff to support a separate fund.<\/p>\n

Of course, if the IMF continues to sit on the sidelines, since it is too hamstrung by differences in views among the membership to play a coordinating role, then an alternative solution is possible.\u00a0 Ukraine\u2019s allies \u00a0could in theory set up another institution- an IFI of the democracies – \u00a0able to create money, such as the IMF, or to borrow backed by a guarantee, such as the World Bank or other development banks, whose authority is ultimately derived from the backing of their membership, notably the advanced economies.\u00a0 However, given the urgency, and the long timeline required to set up a new institution, we think a solution with an IMF programme, preferably a full scale programme, is preferable.<\/p>\n

Size <\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Western governments and IFIs have pledged $35bn of budget financing for Ukraine this year, of which $17bn had been disbursed as of the end of August 2022. This implies that Ukraine should receive another $18bn of financing by end-2022, or $4.5bn per month. While falling short of the official $5.0bn monthly funding gap, the pledged financing provides sufficient support until the end of this year, we think, assuming all partners stick to their promises and follow through with timely disbursement.<\/p>\n

However, there is no visibility over financing for 2023, while Ukraine\u2019s fiscal funding needs will stay high and will be accompanied by the need to rebuild critical infrastructure. As long as military hostilities continue – and we think it is prudent to plan for them continuing through next year \u2013 we see limited scope to reduce the funding needs from the current $5.0bn month. The government has already cut all non-critical spending and will struggle to increase tax revenues materially, given the deep contraction in the economy of 37% y-o-y in 2Q22 and the sharp increase in loss-making enterprises due to Russia\u2019s invasion.\u00a0 \u00a0Still, lower scheduled debt domestic redemptions scheduled for next year and the impact of the recent restructuring of $22bn in sovereign bonds do provide some relief. Overall, we see it as reasonable to assume that the monthly fiscal funding gap will remain high next year, at around $4.0-4.5bn per month, or in the proximity of $50bn for the full year<\/p>\n

We note that the 2023 draft budget prepared by the government assumes fiscal funding needs will be lower next year at $41bn, including a $31bn\u00a0 budget deficit. However, we see two problems with this projection – downside risks and macro stability \u2013 which lead us to propose a higher level of external financing. \u00a0\u00a0Firstly, risks are tilted to the downside in a war situation, and so the government needs to build in a much larger than normal contingency margin.\u00a0 For instance the draft budget assumption of nearly 5% real growth in GDP in 2023 may prove optimistic, and the ability to squeeze non-critical budget spending may be challenged, for instance if the cost of repairing and supporting the newly liberated territories proves high. \u00a0Secondly, the budget assumes higher inflation and a further significant weakening in the currency.\u00a0 Arithmetically, this helps the public finances, allowing FX funding to finance more hryvnia spending, and squeezing budget spending, as government wages, pensions and spending lag inflation.\u00a0 But this is precisely the risky path, which flirts with a currency crisis and risks entrenching high inflation, which could undermine the war effort and we believe Ukraine should avoid.\u00a0 In addition, we believe that providing enough funding to cope with a less favourable scenario will boost credibility, and strengthen financial stability.<\/p>\n

Thus, we propose a fund size of $50bn to provide certainly over budget financing<\/strong> until the end of next year, and through what will likely be the most difficult period of the war.\u00a0 In addition, the government has indicated that it needs $17bn in 2023 to rebuild critical infrastructure.\u00a0 Although over time this reconstruction funding is likely to be separately administered, we see the budget as likely the most convenient arrangement for financing reconstruction while the war continues. If managed together, the fund including urgent reconstruction financing could increase to $65-70 bn.<\/p>\n

While the amount sounds large, it represents only one tenth of one percent of the GDP of Ukraine\u2019s allies, 4% of NATO\u2019s annual budget, and 9% of the spending announced so far by European countries on supporting consumers with energy costs.<\/p>\n

In addition, we note that the financing need can be met with only a modest call on government\u2019s budgets.\u00a0 In particular, Ukraine\u2019s allies can make contributions in the form of SDRs (special drawing rights), the IMF\u2019s special currency. G7 countries\u2019 combined SDR holdings stood at $410bn as of end-August.\u00a0 Moreover, the G7 committed in 2021 to allocate $100 bn of those SDRs to countries in need, and have only committed a small fraction of that amount so far.\u00a0 For instance, if Ukraine\u2019s G7 allies provided 10% of their stock of SDRs to Ukraine, it would cover 80% of Ukraine\u2019s 2023 fiscal funding needs.<\/p>\n

Conditionality<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

In normal times, donors seek to add requirements or conditions to programmes – typically politically unpopular decisions which have the objective of restoring fiscal and external balance, often through fiscal consolidation.\u00a0 And recipients \u2013 while perhaps dreaming of money without strings and typically seeking to ease the difficult measures – often in practice work closely with the donors to design the conditionality so that it is effective at tackling the imbalance which has contributed to the crisis.\u00a0 However, we think that in this case, where Ukraine is in a war \u2013 an existential struggle for survival – \u00a0and fiscal resources are overwhelming directed at funding this effort, normal conditionality is largely redundant and can be dispensed with.\u00a0 We would make three points here.<\/p>\n

First, while Ukraine should do its bit towards financing the war, by raising some additional revenue by reversing the tax cuts announced at the start of the war and by raising more financing from domestic sources, this is of secondary importance. \u00a0In other words, the key source of funding during the war will be external.<\/p>\n

Second, Ukraine is already prioritising expenditure aggressively and cutting everything which does not directly contribute to the war effort, and the imperative of survival gives it the incentive to continue with this approach while the war continues.<\/p>\n

Third, the key anchor for Ukraine\u2019s reform and modernisation is EU integration, which should over time improve governance and create a framework for competitive markets, as it has across Central and Eastern Europe.\u00a0 Here, the government is moving fast to implement the conditions required even during the war.<\/p>\n

Of course, once victory is achieved, the incentives change, since the imperative of existential survival no longer takes precedence.\u00a0 At that point, some \u201cnormal\u201d conditionality may be needed as part of a package where Ukraine takes difficult but important decisions which restore fiscal and external balance, and receives exceptional support from donors and reparations from Russia to rebuild the country.<\/p>\n

\"Victory5\"<\/figure>\n

Grant\/loan mix<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Grants are more helpful to Ukraine than loans, given that Ukraine is having to fund a huge deficit for several years. Ukraine\u2019s debt to GDP ratio will rise to an estimated 85% this year, from 50% in 2021, even though grants account for a sizable 41% of foreign budget support ($15bn out of $35bn) this year. At the moment, Ukraine in effect has no market access abroad, since its ability to service its debt in full is dependent on a number of conditions, such as winning the war and a fast and successful reconstruction, which are not fully under Ukraine\u2019s control.\u00a0 However, Ukraine\u2019s government will need to regain market access as rapidly as possible after the war, to be able to raise sufficient financing for reconstruction. If the whole amount of required financing for next year ($50bn) comes in the form of loans, Ukraine\u2019s debt-to-GDP ratio will surge to 100%, assuming a stable exchange rate and GDP and slowing inflation. To keep Ukraine\u2019s debt-to-GDP ratio in double-digit territory and ensure it is sustainable over the medium-term despite high reconstruction costs , \u00a0donors should provide as much \u00a0financing as possible in the form of grants.<\/p>\n

Country contributions<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

There are a number of different ways of calculating a fair approach to sharing the burden of financing Ukraine\u2019s budget. For instance, one simple approach would be to allocate the financial cost proportionally to GDP.\u00a0 Another way would be to take the same approach, but also take account of aid already provided.\u00a0 A third approach would be to look for a disproportionate response from European countries which are particularly at risk from an aggressive Russia, and propose for instance that they take sole responsibility for half of the support provided to Ukraine.\u00a0 A fourth approach would be require a higher financial contribution from NATO members who are not meeting their commitment to \u00a0spend 2%\u00a0 of GDP on defence, with \u00a0half of the total funding to be raised from such NATO members in proportion to the shortfall in their military spending.<\/p>\n

The general picture from the data is clear.\u00a0 The US is providing significantly more support than Europe, even though the security risk for Europe from Russian aggression is much higher, and the Europeans are the main underspenders on defence.\u00a0 However, within this overall picture, there are nuances with many eastern European countries, notably Poland and the Baltics, providing proportionately even more support than the US.<\/p>\n

\"Victory6\"<\/figure>\n
Conclusion<\/strong><\/h5>\n

Ukraine\u2019s victory is unnecessarily at risk from a disorganised approach to financing Ukraine\u2019s war effort.\u00a0 There is a live risk that central bank financing of the deficit will drive a weaker currency and higher inflation, \u00a0and disrupt the war effort.<\/p>\n

This is a wholly avoidable scenario.\u00a0 Donors have the resources to finance Ukraine, and they should step up.\u00a0 They have already committed in principle to do so, would \u00a0face far higher security and economic costs and risks if Russia is successful and are getting extraordinary<\/em><\/strong> value for money, as Ukraine\u2019s armed forces are proving remarkably effective in their use of resources to degrade Russian military capability, at comparatively low cost.<\/p>\n

To provide certainty about the financing of Ukraine\u2019s war effort and avoid a currency crisis, we propose that donors:<\/p>\n

\u2022 Commit to fully covering the 2023 financing gap with external financing, sufficient to provide a contingency against downside risks and ensure macroeconomic stability;<\/p>\n

\u2022 Organise donor financing through a single fund with a single administrative interface;<\/p>\n

\u2022 In the best case, agreement on a large scale IMF programme of $15 bn US as the centrepiece of this financing effort. But at any an IMF programme, monitored by the Board, which will pave the way for other donors to participate, and provide enough financing to cover the $2.7 bn payments due to the IMF itself next year.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Use a transparent contribution key to ensure that the cost of financing Ukraine is fairly shared across Ukraine\u2019s allies;<\/p>\n

\u2022 Subject to further discussion and analysis of Ukraine\u2019s financing needs, transfer $50 bn USD in value to the fund before the start of 2023\u2013 sufficient to finance the budget even in a less favourable scenario without putting domestic stability at risk;<\/p>\n

\u2022 Allocated as much as possible financing in the form of grants<\/p>\n

\u2022 Commit to regular and predictable monthly disbursements to prevent any further emergency recourse to monetary financing<\/p>\n

We believe this will allow Ukraine\u2019s wartime needs to be financed in full without recourse to monetary financing through the whole \u00a0of 2023.\u00a0 It will provide a stable economic platform to support Ukraine\u2019s armed forces in liberating the country, even as the decline in oil and gas revenues as sanctions bite will put Russia under severe economic strain.\u00a0 Acting promptly and comprehensively to cover Ukraine\u2019s financing needs should shorten the war, and reduce the overall cost of the conflict, compared to the alternative scenario of inadequate and partial Western support.<\/p>\n

Download materials<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Jacob Nell, Olena Bilan, Torbjorn Becker, Yuri Gorodnichenko, Tymofiy Mylovanov and Nataliia Shapoval Download materials Introduction Ukraine has just achieved a stunning success on the battlefield in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, showing that it can win the war. However, we see a growing risk of a major setback on the economic front if donor disbursements continue\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":5257,"template":"","categories":[302],"tags":[269,268,259,228,258],"department":[],"news_type":[224],"project":[],"region":[216],"unit":[223],"class_list":["post-13203","news","type-news","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-recovery-en","tag-demining-en","tag-economic-sectors-en","tag-education-en","tag-expenditures-en","tag-gdp-en","news_type-research","region-ukraine","unit-institute-en"],"acf":{"primary_unit":223,"news_intro":"","header_cta_mode":"event","header_event_cta_text":"\u0414\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0456\u0457","header_event_cta_url":"","header_research_cta_text":"\u0427\u0438\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0438 \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f","header_research_pdf":null,"author_person":"","author_name":"","related_news":null,"related_events":[],"related_people":[],"related_links":null,"external_link":"","external_link_label":"","is_featured":false,"is_featured_archive":false,"quote_text":"","quote_author":"","quote_author_role":"","program_title":"\u0424\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438","program_items":null,"reference_title":"\u0414\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043a\u0430","reference_content":"","source_system":"migration","source_id":"47801","content_owner":"kse","last_reviewed":null,"visibility":"public","platform_id":"","platform_version":"","platform_managed":false},"yoast_head":"\nFinancing Ukraine\u2019s Victory - KSE<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kse.ua\/en\/news\/financing-ukraine-s-victory\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Financing Ukraine\u2019s Victory\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Jacob Nell, Olena Bilan, Torbjorn Becker, Yuri Gorodnichenko, Tymofiy Mylovanov and Nataliia Shapoval Download materials Introduction Ukraine has just achieved a stunning success on the battlefield in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, showing that it can win the war. 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